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I.

LIMITATIONS OVER "ON," "AT," OR "AFTER" THE DEATH OF

THE FIRST TAXER

HERE in any conveyance, whether by will or by deed, land
is limited to A, with no language expressly descriptive of the

size of his estate, and there is a further limitation to B "on,"
or "at," or "after" the death of A, the conveyance is regularly construed

to create a life estate in A, with a vested remainder in fee in B.1 Since the
limitation to B is not qualified with respect to the time or circumstances of
A's death, no other construction is reasonably possible. When a future
interest has been so limited that it is certain to come into possession upon
the death of the prior taker, the latter's estate is naturally considered to
be a life estate unless a contrary intent has been dearly expressed. The
prime attribute of a life estate is its terminability at the death of the owner
thereof; at common law, any estate so terminable was necessarily a life
estate.2 This result, furthermore, is entirely consistent with the provision
in the Illinois Statutes that every estate conveyed shall be deemed a fee
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
xHill v. Gianelli, 221 Ill.
286, 77 N.E. 458 (I9o6); Hurt v. McCartney, 18 Ill.
129 (1856);
Bergan v. Cahill, 55 Ill. 16o (187o). The same rule of construction is applied even though
the first taker is expressly given a power to consume the corpus of the property, Hamlin v.
U.S. Express Co., 107 Ill. 443 (1883); Bradley v. Jenkins, 276 Ill. i61, 114 N.E. 582 (i9z6).
2 Whether this statement is wholly and completely accurate depends upon the view taken
in respect to the estate of a tenant in fee tail special after possibility of issue is extinct. The
estate was certain to end with the death of the tenant, who had no power to bar the entail by
fine or recovery. He was in the same position as a tenant for life without impeachment for
waste. See Challis, Real Property 291-2, 339 (3d ed. 19i). It would seem that he might
properly be said to have only a life estate.
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simple "if a less estate be not limited by express words, or do not appear
to have been granted, conveyed or devised by construction or operation
of law.' 3 The creation of an estate certain to come into possession at the
death of the first taker sufficiently manifests the intent to create in such
4
first taker a life estate only.
After the operation of the Statute of Uses brought into recognition new
legal interests of the executory type, corresponding to springing and shifting uses theretofore valid in equity, it would have been entirely reasonable
to admit the possibility of limiting over a fee simple on the death of the
owner without regard to the time or circumstances of his death. If the intent has been dearly expressed to create a fee simple with such a limitation
over, there is nothing in public policy that requires the expressed intent to
be defeated. Seldom, however, would a conveyor actually intend to create
a fee simple with a limitation over that is certain to come into possession
at the death of the fee simple owner, since, for practical purposes, the distinction between a life estate and a fee simple subject to an executory limtation over "on death" of the first taker is but slight.5 In all cases where
the language is not specific, the construction should be that a life estate
has been created. It was recognized, however, in Vinson v. Vinson6 that
the concept of a fee simple with an executory limitation over that is certain to take effect in possession at death was possible. That case involved
the construction of a deed of a rather common type wherein the grantor
provides that the conveyance shall "take effect at my death," or uses
language of equivalent meaning. Usually the Illinois courts have construed such a deed to reserve to the grantor a life estate, and to create a
remainder in the person named as grantee. 7 In the Vinson case, nevertheless, the appellate court gave clear recognition to the possibility of construing such a deed to create an executory interest (a springing use executed by the Statute of Uses) in the grantee, and to leave in the grantor
until his death the fee simple title. If a fee simple can be made terminable
by a springing executory interest limited in defeasance of the fee in the
3 Ill.
Rev.
4

Stat. (x939)

c. 30,

§ i2.

See Turner v. Hause, i99 Ill.
464, 468-9, 65 N.E. 445, 445-6

(1902) .

s Two principal differences exist. The owner of a defeasible fee has more extensive privileges of user than a life tenant, Gannon v. Peterson, 193 11.372, 62 N.E. 210 (igoi). The

widow of the owner of a defeasible fee is entitled to dower; the widow of a life tenant is not so
entitled, Aloe v. Lowe, 278 Ill. 233, ii5 N.E. 862 (1917).
'4 Ill.
App. 138 (1879).
7Latimer

(1877).

v. Latimer,

174

Ill.
418, 51 N.E. 548 (898); Shackelton v. Sebree, 86 III. 616
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grantor, there is no reason why it may not likewise be made terminable
by a shifting executory interest limited on the death of a prior grantee.8
What language is sufficient to create a fee simple with a certain executory limitation over "on death," would seem to be a problem of construction of intent. Where the grant to the first taker contains words of inheritance ("heirs") or their equivalent, and there is no express statement
that the first taker shall have a life estate only, the intent to create a fee
simple with an executory limitation, rather than a life estate with a remainder, may be thought indicated. The decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Askby v. McKinlock,9 affords some support for this view. The
actual issue in that case was whether the plaintiff, who was suing for specific performance of a contract to convey land, had marketable title. The
plaintiff derived title under the will of her uncle, the third clause of which
read as follows: "I therefore will and bequeath all my estate, both real
and personal, to my beloved niece, Martha Isabella Kerr [the plaintiff]
.... and do make her my sole heir of all my earthly possessions, without
bond or surety." The eighth clause of the will provided: ".... if my
said niece and heir should marry and leave no issue, then said estate shall
go to my brothers and sisters or their children." And the ninth clause:
"If my said niece and heir should leave living issue at her death then said
estate will go to said issue ..... " The court denied the prayer for specific
performance, declaring that the plaintiff had a fee simple which was subject to an executory devise over (rather than a fee simple absolute); and it
further declared most emphatically that the gifts over could not cut down
to a life estate the fee simple which the testator had given the plaintiff in
clear and sufficient terms. The language of the opinion indicates that the
court realized that there were two gifts over-one to the surviving issue of
the plaintiff, and the other to the brothers and sisters of the testator or
s It should be noted that in the situation here discussed there is no valid objection to the
limitation over on the ground that it constitutes a restraint upon alienation. The owner of a
defeasible fee simple can convey the interest that he has. Every executory limitation over
after a fee simple makes the fee defeasible, and for practical purposes makes alienation thereof
more difficult. The practical impediment to alienation arising from the creation of a future
interest has never been considered objectionable unless the future interest has been limited
for the purpose of preventing alienation. A gift over which is a penalty for alienating is void.
The common executory limitation over on death of the first taker without issue impairs the
marketability of the fee simple to a great extent; and an executory limitation over certain to
come into possession on the death of the first taker undoubtedly is an even greater practical
deterrent to alienation, but that fact should not render it invalid. See Schnebly, Restraints
upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 Yale L. J. 961, at 962-3 (1935). Nor can it reasonably be contended that the executory limitation over is "repugnant" to the fee simple in the
first taker, ibid., at 1198 ff.
9 271 Ill. 254, I1 N.E. IoI (I916).
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their descendants-and it would seem that the court thought that one or
the other of these gifts would vest at the death of the plaintiff. If that was
the view taken by the court, then we have an example of a fee simple defeasible on the death of the owner thereof under any circumstances that
can possibly exist at the time of his death. It is strange, however, that the
court should have repudiated so emphatically the contention that the
plaintiff took only a life estate, and yet have failed to indicate any appreciation of the fact that, upon the construction adopted, she had, for practical purposes, but little more than such.
Later decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court have manifested a strong
tendency to construe even such language as appeared in the Ashby case to
create only a life estate in the first taker."' In view of these later cases,
there appears to be little likelihood that the court will hereafter give practical effect to the concept of a fee simple certain to be divested at death,
which was admitted as a possibility in the Vinson case and seemingly as a
possibility in the Ashby case.
Where the estate of the first taker is not expressly delimited, and a future interest is created which is not certain to come into possession on
death of the first taker, it would seem that the first taker should have a
fee simple subject to an executory limitation over. This is the regular construction where the gift over is conditioned upon the occurrence of such
an event as the death of the first taker without issue surviving.- By anal-

10Holding that the first taker has only alife estate despite the fact that words of inheritance
were used in the limitation to him, and despite the further fact that his estate was not expressly
stated to be a life estate: Drager v. McIntosh, 3x6 Inl.46o, 147 N.E. 433 (1925); Liesman v.
Liesman, 331 Ill. 287, 162 N.E. 855 (2928). In both these cases, the construction adopted made
the future interests contingent remainders, destructible in Illinois prior to 192z, when section
40 of chapter 30 of the Illinois Revised Statutes (r939) became effective. In the former case,
such destruction had actually been accomplished. Had the court held the devises to create
fees simple subject to executory limititions over, the latter would have been indestructible.
Where in a will the testator has devised land to one and "his heirs," and has at the same
time expressly declared that such person shall take only a life estate, the Illinois Supreme
Court has construed the devise to create a life estate only, Wallace v. Bozarth, 223 Ill. 339,
79 N.E. 57 (i9o6); Siegwald v. Siegwald, 37 Ill. 430 (i865). Contra: Lambe v. Drayton,
X82 Ill. iio, 55 N.E. i89 (1899); cf. Rissman v. Wierth, 220 Ill. i8i, 77 N.E. io8 (igo6). See
Kales, Estates, Future Interests and Illegal Conditions and Restraints in Illinois § 182 (2d ed.
1920).
Similar language in a deed has likewise been construed to create a life estate only, Miller v.
Mowers, 227 IEl.392, 8i N.E. 421 (1907). In this situation, however, the decision may depend
upon application of the rules governing conflict between the granting clause of the deed and its
habendum. See Roof v. Rule, 348 Ill. 370, 18o N.E. 807 (1932); Nave v. Bailey, 329 Ill. 235,
16o N.E. 6o5 (1928); Harder v. Matthews, 309 Ill. 548, 14 z N.E. 442 (1923); Morton v.
Babb, 251 1l. 488, 96 N.E. 279 (I911).
1zSmith v. Kimbell, 153 Ill. 368, 38 N.E. 1029 (x894); Fifer v. Allen, 228 Ill. 507, 81 N.E.
1105 (1907); Wilson v. Wilson, 261 Ill. 174, io3 N.E. 743 (1913).
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ogy, if land should be conveyed to A, and on his death to B if B should
survive A, it ought to be held that A takes a fee simple subject to defeasance only in the event that B should survive him. The statute heretofore
cited, making every conveyance prima facie one in fee simple, seems to require this result, since there is no express provision for the contingency of
B's death before that of A. To hold that A would take but a life estate,
with a contingent remainder in B, would result in the leaving of a reversion in the conveyor or his heirs. If the conveyance should be by will,
there may be two objections to this construction. Not only does it appear
inconsistent with the statute above mentioned, but it also results in a partial intestacy in many instances.- The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
has shown an inclination to hold that such limitations create a life estate
followed by a contingent remainder.x3 While this view seems erroneous, it
is not difficult to perceive how the mistake has occurred. A life estate followed by a contingent remainder conditioned upon the remainderman's
survival of the life tenant is of common occurrence. It is easy to fall into
the error of concluding that every future interest conditioned upon survival by the donee therein of the first taker is a contingent remainder.
The conclusion that the first taker has but a life estate then follows naturally.
Where the estate of the first taker is not expressly described, and two
or more future interests are created, one or the other of which must certainly vest on the death of the first taker, he should be held to have a life
estate only. 4 The situation is essentially the same as where a single future interest which is certain to vest on death of the first taker is limited.
An illustration is a limitation to A, and on his death in fee to his surviving
children if any; and if he shall leave no children, to B in fee. Such alternative limitations over are frequently spoken of as limitations which "ex12Where the gift over is of the residue of the testator's estate, the construction criticized in
the text would produce a possible intestacy; the same is true where the gift is of specific property and the will does not contain a residuary clause. It has frequently been said that courts
will adopt any reasonable construction to avoid such an intestacy. "It has been said that the
idea of any one deliberately purposing to die testate as to a portion of his estate and intestate
as to another portion is so unusual in the history of testamentary dispositions as to justify
almost any construction to avoid it," Scofield v. 01cott, 120 Ill.
362, 374, 11 N.E. 35', 354
(1887); see Welch v. Caldwell, 226 Ill.
488, 495, 8o N.E. 1014, ioz6 (1907).
X3 McClintock v. Meehan, 273 Ill.
434, 113 N.E. 43 (1:96). In Bushman v. Fraser, 322 Ill.
579, 153 N.E. 6i (1926), the court stated the same conclusion, although the issues of the case
did not necessitate a decision on the problem whether the limitations created a life estate with
a contingent remainder or a fee simple subject to an executory devise over. Since the first taker
was survived by the donee in the gift over, the result would have been the same on either
contruction.
14Healy v. Eastlake, 152 Ill. 424, 39 N.E. 260 (1894).
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haust the possible contingencies.",' Many limitations over which might
seem to fall into this category can be shown not to exhaust literally all
possible contingencies. For example, there may be a devise to a child of
the testator, A, and on his death to his surviving children if any; and if
none, to the other surviving children of the testator. Since by the usual
rule of construction the other children of the testator must survive A in
order to participate in the gift over, there is obviously a possibility not
covered in the limitations; for A may die leaving no surviving children,
and yet there may be at his death no living children of the testator. While
the limitations over do not exhaust the possible contingencies, they may
be sufficiently exhaustive in their scope to warrant the conclusion that
the testator intended A to have only a life estate. 6 The testator may well
have thought that he had provided completely for disposition of the land
at the death of A. In fact, he has made such provisions that it is highly
probable that one or the other of the future interests created will actually
vest. As an indication of the intent to create a life estate only in A, such
7
provisions may be sufficient.'
isKales, op. cit. supra note io, at § 165; Rest., Property § ro8, comment c (1936).
x6In Kleinhans v. Kleinhans, 253 Ill. 620, 97 N.E. 1077 (r9i2), it was held that a devisee
took only a life estate though the court apparently recognized the fact that the limitations
over did not literally exhaust all possible contingencies.
17 For clear cases of limitations over which do not exhaust all possible contingencies, and
which, therefore, are compatible with a fee simple in the first taker, see Stoller v. Doyle, 257
Ill. 369, oo N.E. 959 (1913); Cutler v. Garber, 289 Ill. 200, 124 N.E. 441 (i919)..
In Drager v. McIntosh, 316 Ill. 46o, 147 N.E. 433 (1925), the first limitation over was to the
heirs of the body of the first taker. The second limitation was in this language: "in case any
of my said children shall die leaving no .... children or descendants of .... children, then
the interest of such deceased child shall go to the remainder of my said children or to the
descendants of such as may be dead..... " In construing this second gift over, it may be
possible to hold: (a) that the phrase "remainder of my said children" refers to other children
of the testator living at his death; (b) that the limitation to such children is not absolutely contingent upon their survival of the first taker; (c) that the descendants of a deceased child are
merely substituted for their parent in cases where such child has died in the life of the first
taker leaving descendants surviving him; (d) that where a child has died in the life of the first
taker without leaving descendants surviving him, his heirs are entitled by descent from him to
the share he would have taken if living. If the construction above indicated were adopted, the
two limitations takei together would literally exhaust all possible contingencies, since one or
the other must vest. The actual decision in the case was that the first taker had only a life
estate, but no particular consideration was given to the problem of the precise construction of
the second gift over.
Where the first gift over is to the surviving issue of the first taker, and the second gift over
is to the "heirs" of the testator in the technical sense of the term, the two limitations may be
taken to exhaust all possible contingencies. While it is possible that the testator may leave no
"heirs" at his death, this possibility is so remote that he must certainly have thought that
he had made a complete disposition of the property at the death of the first taker; he may,
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II. LIMITATIONS OVER ON THE DEATH OF THE FIRST TAKER IN LANGUAGE
WHICH IMPLIES A CONTINGENCY

Where property is conveyed to A without express description of his
estate, and there is a limitation over "if he shall die," or "in event of his
death,"' or "in case of his death," a difficult problem of construction is
presented. All the forms of expression quoted suggest a contingency in
respect to the death of A, but do not explicitly state the nature of that
contingency. There can be nothing contingent about the fact of death,
which is certain to occur at one time or another. If there be a contingency
implied in the language, it must dearly have reference to either the time
or the circumstances of death.
A. LIMITATIONS IN DEEDS

If the conveyance is by deed, the explanation of the implied contingency is especially difficult. In this situation, the only explanation that occurs to one is that the grantor intended the gift over to become operative
in possession only if the first taker, A, should die before the donee of the
therefore, be considered to have expressed his intent to give such first taker a life estate only.
Such a case is Thomas v. Miller, 16i Ill. 6o, 43 N.E. 848 (1896).
Where the fist limitation over in substance is to the children of the first taker who shall
attain the age of twenty-one, and the second limitation over is to named persons on death of
the first taker "leaving no children," a difficult case is presented. Since the estate of the first
taker by hypothesis is not described as a life estate, it cannot be assumed a priori that it is
such. Taking the language literally, it is clear that the exact effect of the gifts over cannot
in all instances be determined at the death of the first taker. He may die leaving children under
the age of twenty-one. The first gift over, therefore, may not vest at his death. If the second gift
over is taken literally to mean that the first taker must die without children surviving him, it
cannot vest at his death in the case supposed. Nor can the second vest at his death if it be construed to refer to death of the first taker without leaving children who shall attain the age of
twenty-one at any time. It is submitted that the first taker's estate is a fee simple with executory limitations over which may divest that fee either at his death or at some time subsequent
thereto. It was held, however, in King v. King, 215 Ill. 1oo, 7 4 N.E. 89 (i9o5), that limitations
similar in form to those stated gave the first taker a life estate only.
Where the second limitation over is contingent upon the survival by the donee therein of the
death of the first taker, there is also a possibility for which neither limitation over provides.
In several cases of this type, however, it has been held that the first taker has but a life estate,
Johnson v. Johnson, 98 I1. 564 (1881); Furnish v. Rogers, i54 Il. 569, 39 N.E. 989 (1895);
Johnson v. Askey, 190 Ill. 58, 6o N.E. 76 (i9or); Liesman v. Liesman, 331 In. 287, 162 N.E.
855 (1928); cf. Kleinhans v. Kleinhans, 253 Ill. 620, 97 N.E. 1077 (i912); Lachenmyer v.
Gehlbach, 266 Ill. ii, 107 N.E. 202 (1914); Johnson v. Boland, 343 Ill. 552, 175 N.E. 794
(193).

For further discussion of gifts over which exhaust all possible contingencies, see Subdivision IV C infra.
18In Evans v. Van Meter, 320 Ill. 195, I5O N.E. 693 (1926), the gift over was "in default
of" the death of the first taker. The court construed the quoted phrase as equivalent to "in the
event of."
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gift over. That is, there is an executory limitation over if the donee therein should survive A. The court must choose between this construction,
and the construction that A takes only a life estate despite the implication of a contingency in respect to his death. If the limitation to A contains words of inheritance or their equivalent, it would seem preferable to
construe the limitations of the deed to create a fee simple in A, defeasible
on his death before that of B.
In Cover v. James, 9 a deed conveyed land to H and W, and contained
this provision: "In case of the death of either .... the other to have the
whole of said property ..... " The court construed the deed to create an
estate for joint lives in H and W, with a contingent remainder in fee to the
survivor. So far as the actual decision was concerned, it was immaterial
whether it was put on the ground indicated, or on the ground that H and
W each took an undivided half of the land in fee as a tenant in common
with the other, and that there was an executory limitation over as to each
half in event of the death of the particular cotenant during the life of the
other. By either theory, a fair result could be attained, and effect could
be given to the implication of contingency in respect to death.20
Where, however, a deed conveys land to A, and in event of his death to
B, no cotenancy is created, and the construction adopted in the Cover case
is not possible. Either the implication of contingency must be disregarded, and the deed construed to create only a life estate in A; or the deed
must be construed to create in A a fee subject to divestiture if he shall die
in the lifetime of B. In the absence of words of inheritance or other language indicative of a fee simple in the limitation to A, neither construction can be said to have any great weight of argument in its favor, although it may be suggested that the statutory presumption"x of a fee simple supports the second construction above stated.
B. LIMITATIONS IN WILLS
I. PRIMA FACE CONSTRUCTION

If the conveyance be by means of a devise in a will, two possible explanations of the implication of contingency are apparent. First, it is possible
19

217 Ill. 309, 75 N.E. 490 (I9o5).

20

It can be argued that since one of the two devisees must in normal course of events die

before the other, the death of one in the life of the other is not a contingent event; and, therefore, that neither the construction adopted by the court, nor the alternative suggested in the
text above, gives effect to the implication of contingency. It may be answered, that while one
must die first, it is uncertain which one will die first; that as to each cotenant, his survival of
the other is a contingency. This fact may readily explain why the implication of contingency
crept into the language of the will, even though it be admitted that the language does not
easily suggest the true nature of the contingency implied.
2111. Rev. Stat. (1939) C. 30, § 12.
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that the testator intended the limitation over to vest in possession only in
the event that A should die in the life of him, the testator. Secondly, it
is possible that the testator intended the limitation over to become effective only if A should die before B, the donee in the gift over, thus making
the gift over contingent on B's survival of A. While either of these two
constructions would supply the contingent element that the language
seems to involve, the former would usually appear preferable.22 A testator
may naturally be expected to look forward to the time of his own death,
when his will becomes operative, and to think about the death of his first
devisee with respect to that event, rather than with respect to an event
probable to occur at a more remote point of time. It seems more likely,
therefore, when he suggests a contingency in respect to the death of A,
that such contingency is the death of A in the life of him, the testator,
rather than the death of A before that of B, which would be a more remote event if both A and B should survive the testator.
The authorities, therefore, have quite generally agreed that a devise to
A without description of his estate, followed by a limitation over on his
death in terms implying a contingency, is to be construed prima facie to
mean the death of A in the life of the testator.2 3 The pressure to adopt this
construction would be especially strong if the limitation to A should contain words normally descriptive of a fee simple, such as "heirs," "in fee,"
etc. These words being entirely inconsistent with the intent to give A only
a life estate, a second cogent reason would exist for adopting the construction stated.
The adoption of this construction makes the gift over substitutional,
and not successive. If the gift over ever takes effect in possession, it so
takes effect at the death of the testator, and creates a present interest. If
the first taker survives the testator, he takes an indefeasible fee simple.
The limitations over can never operate to divest a fee simple in A after the
fee has once come into possession at the death of the testator.
2. EVIDENCE REBUTTING THE PRIMA FACIE CONSTRUCTION

The rule stated in the preceding subdivision is but a rule of construction.24 Wherever, therefore, there is sufficient language in the context of
the devise to show that the testator referred to a death of A after his own
death, the intent thus manifested must prevail. Since wills exhibit an infinite variety of phraseologies, no very specific criteria can be stated whereby to determine what language sufficiently manifests the intent of the tes22 Note remarks of the court in Tomlin v. Laws, 3o

IIl. 616, 6xg,

134 N.E. 24, 25 (1922).

2 Ibid.; DeHaan v. DeHaan, 309 Ill. 323, 141 N.E. 184 (1923); Evans v. Van Meter,
320 I1. 195, 15o N.E. 693 (1926); Knight v. Knight, 367 Ill. 646, 12 N.E. (2d) 649 (x938).
24 Tomlin v. Laws, 301 111. 616, 619-20, 134 N.E. 24, 25-6 (1922).
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tator to make the gift over operative in event of a death after his own.
Certain Illinois cases would seem to call for particular comment in this
connection.
In Tomlin v. Laws 2 5 the will before the court made a devise to "my
child, as yet unborn," with a gift over "in the advent of the death of my
child," to the testator's wife for her life, and then over to his brothers and
sisters. At the time the will was executed, the testator was so injured that
he must have contemplated death within a short period. He did in fact
die about a month after execution of the will, and the child in gestation at
his death was born two months later. Under these circumstances, it would
appear extremely doubtful whether the testator could have referred to
death of the unborn child in his own life. The court, nevertheless, thought
that the usual rule should apply, remarking, however, that if he contemplated death of the unborn child after his own death, it was a death of the
child at birth that he had in mind. Obviously, either the construction
adopted by the court or the alternative suggested by it would reach thesame result, since the child was born alive in due course.
In Knight v. Knight,6 the will devised real estate to a son and a daughter, "with the provision that the same not be sold until at least twenty
years after my decease, and in the event of the death of either of the two
named heirs the real estate is to be the property of the survivor." The
court construed these provisions to refer to death in the life of the testator. It may be noted, first, that in Cover v. James2 7 discussed previously,
similar limitations in a deed were held to create an estate for joint lives,
with a contingent remainder to the survivor. There was in that case no
period prior to actual operation of the instrument to which the event of
death could be referred. In that case, moreover, the limitation was to a
husband and wife. In the case of a limitation to a son and a daughter, as
in the Knight case, it may be doubted whether the father would have intended to create either a joint life estate with remainder to the survivor,
or a cotenancy in fee with an executory limitation over as to each undivided interest in event of the death of the owner of such undivided interest
before the death of the other cotenant. Either of these two constructions
would exclude from all future benefit the children of the cotenant dying
first. The second point of comment on this case relates to the fact that
there was a prohibition upon sale of the premises for a period of twenty
years. Such a prohibition was probably void as a restraint upon aliena2s 301 Il. 616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922).
26 367

Ill. 646,

27 2,7

IL. 309, 75 N.E. 490 (i9o5). See discussion in the text supra, at note ig.

12

N.E.

(2d) 649

(I938)-
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tion,21 but nevertheless, the dose association in point of language between
this prohibition and the gift over "in the event of" death suggests strongly
that what the testator had in mind was the death of one of the two children
within the twenty-year period. This suggestion would be the more plausible if it should appear that both children were very young at the time the
will was executed. The rule of construction which the court actually applied related the death mentioned in the instrument to the life of the testator. That rule, as we have seen, arose out of the necessity to explain the
contingent character of the language. Where there is some event other
than the death of the testator to which the death of the devisee can be related with reason, the need for the application of the rule ceases. A testator usually contemplates that his devisees will survive him;29 when he
has any different idea in mind, he is likely to state it explicitly. "Death" of
the devisee should not be construed to mean death in the life of the testator unless there is no other construction which will give reasonable effect
to the language employed.3o It may well be thought that in the Knight
case the testator intended the gift over in event of death to be operative
only if either child should die before expiration of the twenty-year period.
In DeHaanv. DeHaan,3'the testator devised his real estate in trust for
the term of ten years, directing that 34% of the net income therefrom be
paid to his wife, and 66% to three children; he further directed that on
termination of the trust, the real estate should be divided among the wife
and said three children in the proportions above indicated. By another
clause of the will, the testator gave his wife 34% of his personalty; and by
yet another clause he provided that the interest taken by the wife under
the will should go "in case of her death" to a son. The court held that the
gift over "in case of her death" referred to a death in the life of the testa28 A restraint on the alienation of a fee is void in Illinois, even when limited to a period of
years, McNamara v. McNamara, 293 Ill. 54, 127 N.E. 130 (1920); McFadden v. McFadden,
302 Il. 504, 135 N.E. 31 (1922). Query, however, whether the restraint should necessarily
be void where the fee of the first taker is defeasible for the same period by a limitation over
on his death within that period. See Schnebly, op. cit. supra note 8, at 991-2.
29 See note go infra.
30 Where a devise is to A for life, remainder to B, and "in event of" his death to C, death of
B in the life of A is meant, according to the authorities, i Tiffany, Real Property 77 (2d ed.
1920); Theobald, Wills 743 (8th ed. 1927). This holding carries out the principle stated in the
text above, that death should be referred to a point of time after the death of the testator if
that is possible. Where the limitations are to A for life, and "in event of" his death "without
issue surviving," to B, it should be noted that the contingency implied in the phrase "in event
of" is actually explainedin the language following. In such a case, therefore, there is less pressure to construe "death" to mean death in the life of A. Cf. Kleinhans v. Kleinhans, 253 Ill.
62o, 9 7 N.E. 1077 (1912). And see the subsequent discussion in the text, Subdivision IV D.
V' 309 Il- 323, 141 N.E. 184 (1923).
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tor, and that since the widow had survived the testator, she took 34% of
the personalty absolutely, and 34% of the corpus of the realty on termination of the trust. It must be noted that the gift over in this case was applicable to both the realty and the personalty. If the realty alone had been
involved, the death referred to might plausibly have been construed to be
death after that of the testator, but during the trust period of ten years.
In respect to the personalty, however, death during this period could
scarcely have been intended: the will evidently contemplated immediate
payment over to the widow of her share of the personalty, and there
would have been no apparent reason for limiting over her interest therein
on the event of her death after she had come into actual possession and
enjoyment, but during a ten-year period which had no relationship to the
personalty. It is always a dubious construction of language to interpret it
to mean one thing in respect to one kind of property, and another thing in
respect to a different sort of property; it is highly unlikely that the testator
in referring to the death of his wife had more than one point of time in his
mind. The decision, therefore, which construed death to mean death in
the life of the testator, was probably correct. It may be further remarked,
that there was in this case no dose association in point of language between the reference to the ten-year period of the trust and the limitation
over "in case of her death."
Occasional cases are found in which there has been a devise to A for life,
and "in the event of his death," to B. In this situation, the limitation to
B is construed to create a remainder;32 it is not a substitutional limitation
conditioned on the death of A in the life of the testator. At least two
reasons support this conclusion. First, any limitation following an estate
which is explicitly described as a life estate would naturally be construed
to be a remainder. Secondly, to construe the limitation to B as substitutional, depending for its effect on the death of A in the life of the testator,
would cause a partial intestacy in many instances. If A should survive the
testator, there would be no express disposition of the property at A's
death. If there were no residuary clause in the will, or if the limitations
were of the residue of the estate, a partial intestacy would be inevitable.
It has seemed to be the better result, therefore, to construe the limitation
to B as a vested remainder, to come into possession on the death of A after
that of the testator, even though this construction fails to give effect to
the implication of contingency in respect to the death of A.
It might be contended that the limitation to B should be construed as a
contingent remainder, conditioned on B's surviving A, thus giving effect to
32 Millikin

Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 343 I. 55, 174 N.E. 857 (1931); see Kolb v. Landes,

277 Ill. 440, zi5 N.E. 539 (IM17).
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the implication of contingency arising from the language "in event of his
death," employed in the gift to A. The writer believes, however, that such
implication of contingency in respect to the remainder is not justified. A
remainder ought not lightly to be construed as contingent, thus creating a
possibility of intestacy as to the reversionary interest, and making possible the destruction of the remainder where the common law rule of destructibility of contingent remainders continues in force. 33 It would seem
likely, moreover, in cases of this description that the language of contingency has crept into the will without mature consideration on the part
of the testator because of the fact that, in normal course of events, the remainderman, B, cannot take in person unless he survives the life tenant, A.
This fact, present to the mind of the testator, may have induced the
expression importing contingency when no condition was actually intended.
An interesting variation of the type of case last discussed is Millikin
Nat'l Bank v. Wilson.3 4 In that case, the will made a gift to a son for his
life, and "in the event of his death," to his widow; and "in the event of the
death of his widow," to the son's children for their lives; and then to
certain nephews, etc., "living at that time." It was held that the gifts to
the son's widow and to his children were not substitutional, but were successive. While the decision could rest on the simple proposition that a
gift "in the event of" the death of the first taker is not substitutional
where such first taker is expressly or by dear implication given a life
estate only, there were additional factors in this case to support the conclusion. Whenever the limitation over "in the event of" the death of the
first taker is for life only, the implication of contingency in respect to the
death of the first taker is readily explainable. The remainderman for life
can take in possession only if he survives the death of the first taker; this
condition is inherent in the nature of the limitation, and its presence in
the mind of the testator might easily explain his implication of contingency in reference to the death of A, which must occur in the life of B if
the latter is to take. In the case under discussion, the limitation over to
the son's widow was not expressly described as a life estate, but the court
properly so construed it; the limitation to the son's children was expressly
for their lives; it followed that both the limitation to the son's widow and
that to his children ought to be construed as successive.
33

Contingent remainders have been indestructible in Illinois since

1921,

IL. Rev. Stat.

(1939) c. 30, § 40. The destructibility doctrine is still of importance, however, in relation to

the problem of construction discussed in the text above, since for many years yet to come questions will arise as to the legal consequences of transactions occurring prior to the effective date
of the statute.
34343 Ill. 55, z74 N.E. 857 (1931).
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III. LMUTATIONS OVER ON THE DEATH OF THE FIRST TAKER
"WITOUT ISS.E"
A. COMMON LAW CONSTRUCTION-INDEFINITE FAILURE OF ISSUE

The issue of any person includes, when "issue" is used in the broadest
sense, all his descendants. An indefinite failure of issue refers to a failure
in any generation, however remote from the stock of descent.35 Thus, if A
dies leaving B as his surviving issue, and B dies leaving C as his issue, and
D dies leaving E as his issue, and E dies leaving no surviving issue, at that
time the issue of A may be said to have failed. In the early history of the
law, the phrase "die without issue" was commonly used in limiting a remainder after an estate tail. Land would be devised to "A and the heirs of
his body, but if he shall die without issue, to B and his heirs." The intent
to create a fee tail was expressly manifested by the use of the words,
"heirs of his body." The limitation over to B if A should "die without issue" was naturally interpreted to refer to the termination of the estate
tail through a failure of issue whenever that might occur. Thus, the phrase
"die without issue" came to be construed prima facie as referring to an
indefinite failure because of its association with the expressly defined fee
37
tail,36 rather than by reason of the natural meaning of the phrase. Indeed, this construction is very difficult to reconcile with the natural
meaning of the quoted phrase when the phrase is disassociated from the
limitation to "heirs of the body."
To understand the full import of the common law rule of construction
of this phrase "die without issue," it is necessary to note two particular
situations. First, is the case of a limitation to A and his heirs, and if he
shall "die without issue," to B and his heirs. Construing the phrase quoted
to refer to an indefinite failure of issue, the courts naturally drew the conclusion that "heirs" in the limitation to A meant "heirs of the body," and
in consequence A took a fee tail.3s Second, is the case of a limitation to A
for life, and if he shall "die without issue," to B and heirs. Here again, the
quoted phrase, if in a will, was construed to refer to an indefinite failure
of issue. The limitation to B, however, if on an indefinite failure, would not
3SO'Hare v. Johnston, 273 Ill. 458, 475-6, 113 N.E. 127, 133-4 (i916); 2 Simes, Law of
Future Interests § 335 (i936).
36 Jarman, Wills*1320-21 (6th Am. ed. 1893).

37 Ibid., at *521, *II73-74, *1285.
38 It should also be noted that prior to the Statute of Uses (1535), no legal future interest
could be created by limiting a fee simple over on a definite failure of issue. At common law, a
remainder was the only future interest which could validly be limited to a third person. After
the Statute of Uses and after the development of the rule against perpetuities, moreover, a
limitation of a fee over on an indefinite failure of issue would have been too remote.
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be valid at common law unless A took a fee tail, so that B's interest could
be a remainder.S9 There was a rather natural inference, moreover that
the intent must have been for A's estate to continue until the limitation
over to B could come into possession according to its terms as construed.
These considerations resulted in the conclusion that A took a fee tail
4°
despite the fact that the limitation to him was for "life.1
The prima fade construction of the phrase "die without issue" which
has been stated above, yielded to a contrary intent if dearly manifested.
If the language employed made it dear beyond a doubt that the conveyor referred to a definite failure of issue, i.e., to the death of the first
taker without issue surviving at his death, then such manifested intent
was given effect. In such a case, after the Statute of Uses, the first taker
took a fee simple subject to an executory limitation over on his death without surviving issue. In determining what language sufficiently manifested
the intent to make the quoted phrase refer to a definite failure of issue, the
courts drew an illogical distinction between limitations of real and personal property. 4' In respect to the former, far dearer evidence of intent
was required to preclude the prima fade construction.2 In respect to personal property, a gift over if the first taker "shall die leaving no issue,"
was construed to be on a definite failure; 4s and the same was true where
there were limitations to two or more persons, with a gift over to the
"survivor" or "survivors" if any one should "die without issue."44 In regard to real property, however, in neither of these cases was the context
considered sufficiently dear to rebut the prima fade inference of an in45
definite failure.
B. ILLINOIS DECISIONS FAVORING THE DEFINITE-FAILURE CONSTRUCTION

It is a matter of some importance to determine the results of the Illinois decisions in regard to this problem of construction. The adoption of
the indefinite-failure-of-issue construction means that as to land a fee tail
is created. By the Illinois Entail Statute, 46 this fee tail is converted into a
39 See note 38 supra.

4oJarman, Wills *521, *1285 (6th Am. ed. i893).

4' While illogical as to interpretation of language, the distinction was explainable. A limi-

tation over of personal property on an indefinite failure of issue was void for remoteness, since
personal property could not be entailed. The distinction mentioned was the result of an effort
to save limitations over of personalty.
42Jarman, Wills *1326-7 (6th Am. ed. 1893).
43 Forth

v. Chapman, i P. Wins. 663 (Ch. 1720).
v. Sayer, I P. Wins. 534 (Ch. 1718).

44 Hughes

4sForth v. Chapman, z P. Wins. 663 (Ch. 1720); Chadock v. Cowley, Cro. Jac. 695 (K.B.
1625).
46 Ill.

Rev. Stat. (I939) c. 30, § S.
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life estate in the first taker with a remainder in fee simple to his issue.47 If,
on the other hand, the definite-failure-of-issue construction be adopted,
the first taker has a fee simple which is subject to divestiture only if he
4
shall leave no issue surviving at the time of his death. 1
Without dwelling at length on the numerous Illinois decisions in which
the problem has been discussed, it safely may be asserted that very slight
evidence of intent will suffice to induce the court to adopt the construction
of definite failure. It has been held, for example, that a gift over of land if
the first taker shall die "leaving no issue," is on a definite failure. 49 And
where there is a gift over of land to "survivors" on the death without issue
of one of several persons, the same construction has been adopted50 Indeed, it would appear that the Illinois courts have approached closely the
position that the phrase "die without issue" is to be construed prima facie
to refer to a definite failure, thus reversing completely the common law
rule. That virtually this stand has been taken is evidenced by the decision
in Strain v. Sweeney.5' In that case, land was devised to the testator's son,
Dennis "and his heirs forever ....
but in case he should die without
issue of his body, then the same shall go to the heirs of [another son,
Nelson]." In holding that the gift over on death without issue referred to
a definite failure of issue of Dennis at the time of his death, the court
stated the following reasons for this conclusion: (a) that since the specific
devises of the will were in favor of children and grandchildren, it was apparent that the testator had his more immediate issue in mind, and not
the more remote issue; (b) that the word "then" used in the gift over was
an adverb of time, indicating the period at which the gift over was to
become effective, and thus indicating that the issue meant were such issue
as might be living at that time;-- (c) that the limitation over to the "heirs"
of Nelson meant the children of Nelson, since he was living at the date of
execution of the will and then had living children, and that the testator
would not have made a limitation to the children of Nelson to come into
47If the first taker has children living at the date the conveyance becomes operative, the
remainder vests at once in such children, subject only to opening to admit later-born children,
Stearns v. Curry, 306 Ill. 94, 137 N.E. 471 (1922).
48 As will appear from the later discussion in the text, the limitation over may be construed
to become effective only if the death of the first taker without issue should occur within a
prescribed period of time. See Subdivisions IV B, C and D infra.
49 Smith v. Kimbell, 153 Il. 368, 38 N.E. 1029 (1894); Metzen v. Schopp, 202 Ill. 275, 67
N.E. 36 (i9o3); Hickox v. Klaholt, 291 Il. 544, 126 N.E. 166 (1920).
so Summers v. Smith, 127 Ill. 645, 21 N.E. 1g (x889); Hinrichsen v. Hinrichsen, 172 Ill.
462, 50 N.E. 135 (i898).
s1 163 Iii. 6o3, 45 N.E. 201 (1896).
52 On the significance of the word "then," compare the decision in Tolley v. Wilson, 371
I1l. 124, 2o N.E. (2d) 68 (i939). See also Jarman, Wills *993 (6th Am. ed. 1893).
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possession at a time more remote than the death of Dennis. It is submitted that if factors such as these are sufficient to rebut the prima fade
construction of "die without issue" as referring to an indefinite failure,
there will be few cases left in which that prima facie construction can be
applied. The decision must be taken as a substantial repudiation of the
53
prima facie rule of the common law.
While it seems fairly probable that in any case which may arise the
court will be able to find in the context of the instrument sufficient language to satisfy itself that a definite failure of issue was intended, the
draftsman of any instrument who has occasion to make a limitation over
on death without issue would do well to make his intent so dear that there
cannot be room for controversy. No one, of course, at the present time
should attempt to make a limitation over on an indefinite failure of issue.
He cannot by this means create a common law fee tail in land, for the
Entail Statute will nullify his effort. Practically, therefore, he can use
only the limitation over on a definite failure. To express his intent beyond
a doubt, he should make the limitation read: "and if the said (first taker)
shall die without leaving issue living at the time of his death, then
(over)."
C. "WITHOUT ISSUE" CONSTRUED TO MEAN "WITHOUT HAVING HAD ISSUE"

While the conclusion that the phrase "die without issue" does not refer
to an indefinite failure of issue disposes of any contention that an estate
s3 In Strain v. Sweeney, the court declared: "But the decisions upon this subject are exceedingly arbitrary, and without much foundation in reason or common sense. Hence, courts
will seize hold of slight circumstances to give to executory devises a construction which regards
the failure of issue as relating to a definite period of time ... ." 163 Ill.
6o3, 606-7,45 N.E. 2o,
202 (1896). In O'Hare v. Johnston, 273 Ill.
458, 113 N.E. 127 (1916), the above quotation
was approved, although the court was able to evade the actual problem by construing "issue"
to mean "children."
Another interesting decision bearing on this problem is Hickox v. Klaholt, 291 Ill. 544,
126 N.E. i66 (1920). A devise was to a daughter "and the heirs of her body," with a further
limitation as follows: if the said daughter should die "without leaving heirs of her body," to
the "survivors" of her brothers and sisters; and if she should die "leaving children," then to
such children. The court held: that the devise created a fee tail in the daughter, which was
converted by the Entail Statute into a life estate in said daughter, with a remainder that
vested in her children; that the limitation over if she should die "without leaving heirs of her
body" was on a definite failure of issue, and took effect as an executory devise. It was true
in this case that there were several factors which tended to indicate a definite failure of issue
such as the word "leaving," the limitation to the "survivors" of the brothers and sisters,
and the limitation to "children" of the daughter. Since, however, the devise was construed
as intended to create a fee tail at common law, there was a strong inference that the gift over
was intended to be a remainder after the fee tail, and such a remainder would naturally be on
an indefinite failure of issue. The decision, therefore, may be considered as significant in rejecting the construction of indefinite failure. A like decision was reached on similar facts in Metzen
v. Schopp, 202 Ill. 275, 67 N.E. 36 (i9o3). See Kales, op. cit. supra note io, at § 548.
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tail has been created, it does not fix definitely the exact meaning of the
phrase. It might reasonably be thought that if the reference is not to an
indefinite failure of issue, then it must be to a definite failure, that is, to
the death of the first taker without issue surviving at the time of his death.
The law, however, has not always developed according to the rule of reason. Another possible construction of this phrase must be considered because in Illinois it has the sanction of several decisions.
Can the phrase "die without issue" be construed to refer, not to a failure
of issue at the death of the first taker, but to the failure of such first taker
to have issue born to him? Interpreted in this latter sense, the phrase
"death without issue" is equivalent to "death without having had issue."
It is doubtful if any layman would think of attaching this latter significance to the phrase; that interpretation must be credited to the ingenuity of hard-pressed counsel, and of courts who have sought escape
from the supposed hardships of a more natural construction or who have
misinterpreted certain precedents.
Where property is limited to A in fee, with a gift over on his "death
without issue," the writer can think of no plausible reason for construing
the gift over to be conditioned on failure of A to have issue born. The
testator who limits property over on the death of the first donee without
issue naturally expects that if the first donee leaves surviving issue, such
issue will succeed to the property by way of descent or devise from the
first donee; he desires to shift the property into a different course of devolution only if the situation at the death of the first donee shall be such
that this normally expected succession of the issue cannot take place because of the failure of issue at that time. Whether the first donee did or
did not have issue born to him during his life would seem dearly of no
consequence if no issue survive him to take in the expected manner.
Where land is limited to A in fee and over if he shall die without issue, it
is rather shocking to the sensibilities of the person untrained in the intricacies and eccentricities of the law to learn that the land may pass on
the death of A without surviving issue to his collateral heirs merely because he had a child born who predeceased him.
In one situation, and in only one, is there plausibility and justification
for construing the phrase "die without issue" to mean "die without having
had issue." This situation is that in which property is limited to A for life,
with a remainder to his issue, or to some particular class of issue, and a
gift over on A's death "without issue." Perhaps the best illustration is a
gift to A for life, remainder to his "children," and a gift over in event of
A's "death without issue." Four possible constructions of such a limitation may be considered:
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a) "Death without issue" might be taken to refer to an indefinite
failure of issue of A. A's estate would then be enlarged to a fee tail.54 The
limitation to his children must then be held to create either a remainder
after the fee tail or life estates preceding the estate tail. Either of these
two constructions of the limitation to the children is obviously inconsistent with the manifest intent that A shall have an immediate estate and
that all the children shall take in possession at the death of A. At common law, a fee tail created in A would have descended on his death only to
his eldest son under the rule of primogeniture. This construction of the
phrase "death without issue" was, therefore, not tenable even in the
earlier history of the common law, when the fee tail was a common estate. s
At the present day, since the common law fee tail has been abolished, such
a construction would not usually commend itself to the courts, as appears
from the prior discussion of the Illinois decisions favoring the definitefailure construction.
b) "Death without issue" might be construed to refer to a definite
failure of issue at the death of A. This construction would divest the remainder vested in a child of A if such child should predecease A. Reluctance to divest a vested interest militated against adoption of this interpretation. It seems fairly dear, moreover, that "issue" as here used ought
to be taken to describe the particular class of issue previously mentioned, that is, "children." This interpretation of "issue" would condition
the gift over on "death without children."
c) If "death without issue" is construed to mean "death without children," and that phrase is in turn construed to mean "without children
surviving A," a cogent objection to the construction arises. A child of A,
who by the usual rules of construction would acquire a vested interest at
his birth,s6 may die in the life of A leaving issue. The interest of the issue
of said child of A would be defeated if A should subsequently die without
leaving "children" surviving him. In this case, the objection to divestiture of a vested interest becomes especially forceful.
d) "Death -without issue" can be interpreted to refer to a default of
takers under the prior limitation. So soon as any interest vests under such
prior limitation, the gift over can be held to be defeated, so that it can
never effect a divestiture of the previously vested interest. This construction has a degree of plausibility so far as the interpretation of language
is concerned. "Die without issue" may be intended by the testator to
54 See text supra, Subdivision III A.

ss Theobald, Wills 796-7 (8th ed.
s6 Field

1927); Jarman, Wills *1298 ff. (6th Am. ed. 1893).

v. Peeples, i8o 11. 376, 54 N.E. 304 (x899); Tolley v. Wilson, 371 I.
io, at § 3o8.

(2d) 68 (1939); Kales, op. cit. supra note

124, 2o

N.E.
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refer to a failure of the particular class of issue described to take vested
interests by the terms of the prior gift. This construction, moreover,
avoids the difficulties suggested in reference to the other conceivable interpretations of the language. Such a construction is often described shortly
as an interpretation of the phrase "die without issue" to mean "die without having had issue." The English decisions fully established this construction in the type of case here discussed, that is, where there is a prior
7
gift to the issue.,
Where, however, there is no prior gift to the issue, as in the case of a
limitation to A, and if he shall "die without issue," to B, there is no
ground for such a construction~5 By the common law rule, the limitation
over here must be considered to be on a general failure of issue, so that a
fee tail is created in A. If this construction be rejected at the present day,
and the assumption be made that A is intended to take a fee simple, and
not merely a life estate, then the natural construction of the gift over is
that it will become effective in possession if A shall die without issue surviving at the time of his death. None of the arguments justifying the construction of "die without issue" to mean "die without having had issue"
are applicable here. While the gift over divests a vested interest, the intent that it shall so operate is too clear for dispute, and any possible construction which may be given to the phrase effects such a possible divestiture. To construe "die without issue" to mean "without having had issue"
minimizes slightly the chances of a divestitute occurring, but is a forced
and arbitrary construction which finds no plausibility in the language,
and has no practical merit sufficient to justify it.
A few Illinois decisions s9 declaring that "death without issue" is to be
57Jarman, Wills *1286-i3o7, especially at *1293, n. (c) (6th Am. ed. x893).
Because of the reluctance to divest an interest once it has vested, particularly an interest
vested in children of the life tenant, the English decisions have carried the rule to the extent of
holding that even the phrase, "die without leaving children (or issue)," means "without having
had children (or issue)," if by a prior limitation an interest is vested in such children or issue,
Jarman, Wills *1638 (6th Am. ed. 1893); Theobald, Wills 790 (8th ed. 1927); Kales, op. cit.
supra note io, at § 540.
s8 Jarman, Wills *1324-27 (6th Am. ed. 1893); Theobald, Wills 792 (8th ed. 1927); Kales,
op. cit. supra note 10, at § 539.
s9Voris v. Sloan, 68 Ill. 588 (1873); Field v. Peeples, 18o Ill. 376, 54 N.E. 304 (x899);
King v. King, 215 Ill. 100, 74 N.E. 89 (i9o5). Of the Voris case it may be remarked that the
decision was very obscure, it not being at all clear how the court reached the conclusion that a
remainder was vested in the issue of the first taker. It is noted in the opinion that the court
had received no assistance from the brief of one of the parties. In neither of the other two
cases cited does it appear to have been necessary to determine the exact nature of the limitation over on "death without issue"; these latter cases, therefore, are not weighty precedents
for even the restricted proposition that "death without issue" means "without having had
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construed to mean "without having had issue" can be explained as cases
of the type heretofore discussed, where there were prior limitations to the
issue, or a particular class thereof, which had become vested. Other Illinois cases, however, have extended the rule far beyond this situation,
and have stated a general rule to the effect that "death without issue"
means "death without having had issue. ' '60 The Illinois authorities favoring this broad rule have perhaps been influenced in some measure by the
fact that adoption of this rule afforded one means of escape from construing "death without issue" to refer to an indefinite failure of issue creating
a fee tail. As has been indicated, however, a simpler method of escape
from that conclusion lies in the construction of "death without issue" to
mean "death without issue surviving" at the death of the first taker.
Probably the Illinois authorities are better explained as erroneous decisions resulting in the first instance from a misunderstanding of the distinctions, heretofore pointed out, in the English cases. Later decisions
have followed the earlier ones blindly without any real examination of the
bases therefor.
The first of the Illinois decisions stating the broad rule that "death
without issue" means "death without having had issue," irrespective of
the absence of a prior vested interest in the issue, is Stafford v. Read,6'
decided in i9io. The authorities cited in this decision were Field v.
Peeples, 62King v. King, Voris v. Sloan,6 4all cases in which actually there
were prior limitations vesting interests in the issue. Apparently the difference in the situations was not noted or not comprehended. The Stafford
issue" where a prior limitation has vested a remainder in the issue. For a further point of
objection to the decision in the King case, see Kales, op. cit. supra note 1o, at § 54o.
In Winchell v. Winchell, 259 Ill. 471, 102 N.E. 823 (1913), land was devised to D for life,
and on her death to "her heirs," with a further provision that the land should pass to the heirs
of the testator if D should "die without issue." The court held correctly that D took a fee tail
by the Rule in Shelley's Case, and that the said fee tail was converted by the Entail Statute
into a life estate in D with a remainder in fee simple which vested in her child at birth. It was
further declared that "die without issue" meant "without having had issue," and that the
ultimate limitation over therefore failed on birth of a child to D. The situation here created
by the Entail Statute was the same situation which has been discussed in the text supra. If the
statutory remainder vested in the issue of the first taker can be viewed as identical with a
remainder so vested by the express provisions of the instrument, then this decision on the
construction of "die without issue" may be supported.
do Stafford v. Read, 24411. 138, 91 N.E. 91 (zgio); Kendall v. Taylor, 245 I1. 617, 92 N.E.
562 (9io); Noth v. Noth, 292 Ill. 536, 127 N.E. 113 (1920); Clark v. Leavitt, 330 Ill. 350,
161 N.E. 751 (1928).
6, 244 Ill. 138, 91 N.E. 91 (igio).

Il. 376, 54 N.E. 3o4 (1899).
63 215 IMI.
Ioo, 74 N.E. 89 (19o5).
62 180

64 68 Ill. 588 (1873).
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case was followed in the same year by Kendall v. Taylor, s and by Noth v.
Noth in 192o,66 without further consideration of the problem; and was
again approved in Clark v. Leavit6 in 1928. The last mentioned decision
cannot be regarded as weighty, since the first taker had actually died
without having had issue so that regardless of the precise construction of
the gift over, it had become effective.
Whether the four decisions mentioned can be regarded as establishing in
Illinois a general rule that "death without issue" means "death without
having had issue," may admit of doubt. Summers v. Smith,8 decided in
1889, is the first Illinois decision giving serious consideration to the construction of the phrase "die without issue." The court considered but two
possible constructions: first, that the gift over was on an indefinite failure
of issue, creating a fee tail; secondly, that the gift over was conditioned on
death of the first taker without leaving issue surviving him at his death.
The decision held in favor of the latter construction, the court declaring
in the most explicit terms that the gift over, which was in this case on
death of the first taker "without heirs of his body," 69 became effective in
possession on death of the first taker "without leaving such heirs of body
as the estate would have vested in, in fee, instantly, upon the death of the
first devisee ..... ,,70 While it is true that in this case the first taker had
apparently died without ever having had issue, and that the result would
have been the same had the court construed the gift over to be conditioned
on his death "without having had issue," it is noteworthy that such con-.
struction was not even mentioned. In Strainv. Sweeney, in 1896, the court
was called upon to construe a will wherein land was devised over on the
death of the first taker "without issue of his body." It was held dearly
and expressly that the limitation over would become operative on death of
the first taker "without leaving any children when he died. ' 71 In this case,
the issues of the case would seem to have called for a determination of the
exact meaning of the quoted phrase. It is again significant that no mention was made of the construction heretofore criticized. In Pitzer v. Morrison72 and Gavin v. Carroll,73 in 1916 and I9M7 respectively, the issues

again called for a decision as to the precise construction of the phrase "die
N.E. 562 (1gIO).
6 33011. 350, z61 N.E. 751 (1928).
N.E. 113 (1920).
68 127 Ill. 645, 2r N.E. i91 (i889).
69 The gift over in these terms, for purposes of the present discussion, may be deemed the
equivalent of a gift over on death "without issue."
70 127 Ill. 645, 6,5, 21 N.E. 191, 192 (i889).
71 163 Ill. 6o3, 61o, 45 N.E. 201, 203 (i896).
6S245 Ill. 617, 92

66 292 Ill. 536, 127

72 272

Ill. 291, i1 N.E. 1017 (196).

73276

Ill. 478, 114 N.E.

927 (1917).
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without issue." In both cases it was held that it meant without "surviv-

4
ing" issue, no other construction being even argued, so far as appears.
The most recent Illinois case dealing with the problem is Tolley v.
Wilson,75 decided in i939. In this case, the limitations were to a son, S,
for life, remainder "unto the children of my said son [S] that may be born
to him," and a gift over "in case my said son shall die without issue," to
brothers and sisters of the testator. S died, having had two children, both
of whom predeceased him. It was held that the fee vested in the children
of S at their births, and on their deaths passed by the laws of descent to
their heirs; that in this situation "die without issue" meant "die without
having had issue." This decision was a correct one in the light of the English and Illinois precedents. The prior limitation to the children of S required the gift over to be construed as conditioned on failure of S to have
children born, as heretofore explained. That the court recognized this to
be the proper basis for the decision appears clearly from the language of
the opinion. Unfortunately, the court cited, with seeming approval, Stafford v. Read, Kendall v. Taylor, Noth v. Noth, and Clark v. Leavitt, which
the writer has previously criticized. 76 This seeming approval of these four
cases cannot be reconciled with the other language of the opinion, which
states the rule to be, "If there is no independent gift to the children of the
first taker, 'without' means primarily 'without children surviving' the first
taker." 77 In view of this explicit recognition of the appropriate rule, and
in view of the earlier decisions inconsistent with Stafford v. Read, Kendall
v. Taylor, Noth v. Noth, and Clark v. Leavitt, one may perhaps hope that
when the problem is again presented to the Illinois Supreme Court, it will
definitely overrule these four decisions.
It must be understood that the Illinois precedents which have construed "death without issue" to mean "death without having had issue"
are not applicable where the gift over is upon death "without leaving
issue," or where equivalent language has been employed manifesting
clearly the intent that such gift shall become operative if the first taker
shall die without issue surviving at the time of his death. The intent to
condition the gift over on death without surviving issue may appear from
the nature of the limitations rather than from the form of the phraseology
used. Such intent would appear to be expressed where the limitations are

74See Gannon v. Peterson, 193 Ill. 372, 380, 62 N.E. 210, 213 (19oi).
124, 2o N.E. (2d) 68 (1939).
7s371 Ill.

76Cases cited supra notes 61, 65-67.

N.E. (2d) 68, 71 (1939).
368, 38 N.E. 1029 (1894);
78Smith v. Kimbell, 153 Ill.
77 371 Ill. 124, 130, 2o

But d. remarks in note 57 supra.

Theobald, Wills 791 (8th ed. 1927).
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in the general form: to A for life, remainder to his surviving children (or
issue); and "if he shall die without children (or issue)," over to B. It
seems to be agreed in this type of case that the gift over is conditioned on
death of the first taker without issue then surviving. 79 Since the remainder to the issue is in terms contingent upon their survival of the first
taker, the remainder to B is naturally construed as an alternative, to take
effect in possession if at the death of the first taker there are no issue then
surviving. It is certainly impossible in such a case to construe "death
without issue" to mean "death without having had issue."
IV.

LIMITATIONS OVER ON THE DEATH OF THE FIRST TAKER
WITHOUT ISSUE SURVIVING AT HIS DEATH

If the gift over is explicitly conditioned on the death of the first taker
"without issue surviving at his death," it would seem dear that the gift
over cannot be construed to be on an indefinite failure of issue; no fee tail,
therefore, can be created by such a gift over. Nor can the phrase above
quoted be construed to mean "without having had issue." The only admissible construction, therefore, is that the future interest created can
come into possession only if the first taker at the time of his death leaves
no issue surviving him; the gift over is on a definite failure of issue.
Further problems, however, remain for solution. These problems are best
understood by a consideration of the several different factual situations
described in the subtitles which follow.
A. LMITATIONS IN THE FORM: TO A FOR IFE; IF HE SHALL DIE
WITHOUT SURVIVING ISSUE, TO B

It should be noted that in the situation described in the subtitle there is
in express terms no gift to the issue of A. Since A is given in definite
terms a life estate only, his issue cannot possibly take from him, either by
descent or devise. By the language of the limitation, the lack of surviving
issue of A at the time of his death is made simply a condition precedent to
the vesting of the gift over, which is a contingent remainder.8 " In such a
79Healy v. Eastlake, 152 Ill.
424, 39 N.E. 260 (1894); Johnson v. Askey, i9o Ill. 58, 6o
N.E. 76 (igoi); Blakeley v. Mansfield, 274 Ill. 133, 113 N.E. 38 (1916); Robeson v. Cochran,
332, 1o9 N.E. 300 (1915);
255 Ill. 355, 99 N.E. 649 (1912); cf. Spencer v. Spencer, 268 Ill.

zoo, 74 N.E. 89 (igo5), commented upon in Kales, op. cit. supra note io,
Ying v. King, 215 Ill.
at § 540.
8oBond v. Moore, 236 111. 576, 86 N.E. 386 (19o8). In Dell v. Herman, 365 II. 261, 6 N.E.
(2d) 159 (1937), land was devised by a testator to a daughter for life, "and after her death
(if she should die without issue)," over to her brothers and sisters, etc. At the time the will
was executed, the said daughter was fifty-five years old and unmarried. At the time of the
suit which required a construction of the will, the daughter was dead without issue. The court
held that the remainder was vested at the death of the testator. It is difficult to support this
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case, there is a strong suggestion of bad draftsmanship; it would seem
likely that the testator actually intended the surviving issue of A to take
on termination of the life estate. Several courts have felt justified under
these circumstances in drawing from the language of the will the inference
of an intent to make a gift to the issue.,: In Illinois, the court denied the
inference in Bond v. Moore.s2 That case, however, exhibited this peculiarity, that the life tenant took by descent, as sole heir of the testator, the
reversion left by creation of the contingent remainder conditioned on the
death of the life tenant without issue surviving him. It was, therefore,
within the power of the life tenant to provide for his issue, either by permitting the reversion to descend on his death intestate, or by devising it
to his said issue by his will. Considering the uncertain condition of the fllinois authorities in respect to the general problem of gifts by implication, 3 it is possible that the Illinois Supreme Court might be induced to
find a gift to the issue by implication in a case where the peculiarity of the
Bond case is not present.
Where there is a limitation to A for life, remainder to his surviving issue,
if any, and if he shall die without leaving issue surviving, over to B, alternative contingent remainders are created, and a reversion is left. 4 In this
situation express provision has been made for the surviving issue of A.
The point to be emphasized in the present connection is, that a gift
over on death without issue does not constitute a limitation to the issue,
but merely states a condition precedent to the vesting of the gift over.
The situation which has been discussed above in connection with the
Bond case is the one situation in which there is ground for the contention
that the gift over on death without issue implies a gift to the issue. In
decision, which treats the parenthetical condition as wholly ineffectual, unless it can be
thought that the parenthetical statement viewed in the light of attendant circumstances was
intended to express, not a condition, but a mere supposition on the part of the testator as to
the situation which would exist at the death of the life tenant.
812 Simes, Law of Future Interests § 434 (x936); see Jarman, Wills *522 (6th Am. ed. 1893).
82 236 Il. 576, 86 N.E. 386 (i9o8). The limitation over in this case was if the life tenant
should die "without children." In so far as the problem of implication is concerned, the situation is the same as if the gift over had been on death "without issue."
83 In situations of a somewhat different character from that in Bond v. Moore, devises by
implication were found in the following cases: Connor v. Gardner, 230 Ill. 258, 82 N.E. 640
(19o7); Martin v. Martin, 273 Ill. 595, 113 N.E. 15o (iq96).
A devise by implication was
denied in First Trust & Savings Bank v. Olson, 353 Ill. 206, 187 N.E. 282 (1933). It is difficult
to reconcile these three decisions, and also difficult to reconcile the first two cited with the
Bond case on any other basis than an arbitrary distinction as to the factual situations; cf.
Hampton v. Dill, 354 Il. 415, 88 N.E. 419 (1933).
84 Blakeley v. Mansfield, 274 Ill. 133, 113 N.E. 38 (i9i6); Smith v. Chester, 272 Ill. 428,
112 N.E. 325 (1916).
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the cases dealt with in the following subdivisions of this article, there is
no ground for such a contention, as will appear more clearly at a later
point.
B. LIMITATIONS IN THE FORM: TO A IN FEE; IF HE SHALL DIE
WITHOUT SURVIVING ISSUE, TO B

In the type of case here discussed, the limitations are substantially in
the form indicated in the subtitle. The language employed is such as to
indicate the intent to limit the land over in event of the death of A without issue (or children) surviving him at his death. Such language, it previously has been shown, cannot be construed to refer to an indefinite
failure of issue,sS nor can it be construed to mean "without having had
issue." 86 If the limitation over should be on "death without issue," and
should the court construe that phrase to be the equivalent in meaning of
the phrase "death without issue surviving,"8 7 then such limitation would
also be within the scope of the ensuing discussion.
In the situation here described, it is entirely clear that no gift has been
made to the issue of A. No intent to give the issue an interest is expressly
stated, nor is there any reasonable ground for inferring such an intent. A
takes a fee simple, for the reasons set forth previously in Subdivision I,
whether or not the limitation to him includes words of inheritance. If
such a fee simple vests in A, it may descend to his issue, or he may devise
it to them. There is, therefore, no ground for implying a limitation in
favor of the issue, who obviously are intended to take through A if they
take at all.
The real problem in this type of case is the meaning of the phrase "die
without surviving issue" in respect to the time of such death. Does this
phrase refer to the death of A at any time when he may in fact die, or does
it refer only to his death during a limited period of time? If the limitations are contained in a deed, it is difficult to perceive more than one
possible construction; the death of A which is meant must be his death
whenever it may occur." If the limitations are in a will, however, it is
possible to contend that the death meant is only a death without surviving issue in the life of the testator.
Since there is no express qualification respecting the time of A's death, it
would seem that the language naturally means the death of A whenever
it may in fact occur, whether in the life of the testator, or thereafter.8 9
85See text supra, Subdivisions III A and B.

86See text supra, Subdivision MI C.
87 See text supra, Subdivigion III B.
88Stoller v. Doyle, 257 Ill.
369, roo N.E. 959 (1913).
8
9"Considering the language used by the testator in this case in its natural and primary
sense, it must be held to refer to the death of either or both of the grandchildren without issue

GIFTS OVER ON DEATH OF FIRST TAKER

There are two particular reasons for so interpreting the language. First,
it is likely that the average testator expects the devisees of his will to survive him; 90 when he has any different idea, he will probably express it
affirmatively. Second, every gift over on death without surviving issue
naturally contemplates the probability that any surviving issue will benefit indirectly under the gift to the ancestor; a testator will normally make
such a gift over only in those situations where the surviving issue can so
benefit. Where the first taker, A, dies in the life of the testator, his surviving issue cannot take under the will, since by hypothesis no gift has been
made to the issue. They can take only if there is a statute against lapse
broad enough in its terms to include the particular case. The Illinois
statute against lapse is applicable only where the first taker is a descendant of the testator. If the first taker is not a descendant of the testator,
his surviving issue cannot take under the statute. It is difficult to believe
that a testator would make a gift over on death of the first taker without
issue, intending to refer only to such a death in his own life, if the surviving issue of the first taker could not possibly benefit in any manner from
the gift to the first taker. Indeed, even where the lapse statute permits
the surviving issue of the first taker to stand in his place, it is doubtful if
the testator is aware of that provision and has made the gift over on the
supposition that any surviving issue will take in that manner.
On the other hand, if the condition of the gift over is the death of A
at any time without surviving issue, then A's interest is practically unmarketable for his whole life, since no purchaser will assume the risk of a
divestiture of his title on A's death unless he is able to purchase A's interest at a great sacrifice on the part of the latter. Nor will A be justified in
expending considerable sums of money by way of improvement upon the
land devised in view of the possible loss of such expenditures on his death
at any time, either before or after the death of the testator. Unless something is said in the
context which requires such a construction, it would not naturally be understood that the
testator intended that the death of either or both of the grandchildren without issue must
happen within some particular period or before some other event," Fifer v. Allen, 228 E1l. 507,
225, 227-8, 82 N.E. 614,
512, 8r N.E. zio5, iio6 (1907); see Crocker v. VanVllssingen, 230 Ill.
615 (1907).
90 "Generally, a testator does not assume that one for whom he is making provision will not
survive him, and intends, in the case of death of such person prior to his own, to provide for
the new state of affairs by a new will or codicil," Bradsby v. Wallace, 202 11. 239, 245, 66 N.E.
ro88, o89 (1903).

91The Illinois statute against lapse is section ii of chapter 39, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939),
reenacted as section 49 of the new Probate Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 3, § 2oo. The statute
is not applicable where the testator has expressly provided for lapse, Walker v. Walker, 283
Ill. ii, xi8 N.E. 1014 (1918); Hartwick v. Heberling, 364 Ill. 523, 4 N.E. (2d) 965 (1936).
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without surviving issue. Thus A may be deprived of a large share of the
benefit that the testator may conceivably have intended him to have.92
These last considerations argue strongly for construing the gift over to
refer only to a death of A without issue in the life of the testator. That
construction has been adopted by many courts. 93 Beneficial as such a
construction may be from the viewpoint of A, it is difficult to reconcile
with the unqualified nature of the language employed.
In Illinois, it may be taken to be the established rule that "death
without surviving issue" refers to death of the first taker at any time
when such death may in fact occur, unless other language of the instrument indicates a contrary intent. 94 This rule of prima fade construction
is occasionally supported by affirmative evidence of the testator's intent.
There is no room for argument as to construction where the testator has
expressly stated that he refers to death of the first taker either before or
after his own death. 95 And the relative ages of the testator and the first
taker, or the physical condition of the testator at the time of execution
of his will, may point strongly toward the conclusion that he must have
had in contemplation a death after his own.96
This rule of prima facie construction adopted in Illinois yields to any
expression of contrary intent which may appear in the instrument con92 See

Hilliard v. Kearney, 45 N.C. *221 (1853).
Simes, Law of Future Interests § 328 (1936).
94 Smith v. Kimbell, 153 Ill. 368, 38 N.E. 1029 (1894); Bradsby v. Wallace, 202 I1. 239,
66 N.E. io88 (i9o3); Fifer v. Allen, 228 11. 5o7, 8i N.E. ixo5 (19o7); Ahlfield v. Curtis, 229
Ill. 139, 82 N.E. 276 (1907); Carpenter v. Sangamon Trust Co., 229 Iil. 486, 82 N.E. 418
93 2

(1907); Crocker v. Van Vlissingen, 230

l. 225, 82 N.E. 614 (1907); Brenock v. Brenock, 23o

Il. 519, 8z N.E. 816 (,907); Wilson v. Wilson, 261 ]DI. 174, 1o3 N.E. 743 (IM13); Defrees v.
Brydon, 275 Ill. 530, II4 N.E. 336 (ixgi6); Lee v. Roberson, 297 Il. 321, 13o N.E. 774 (1921);
see Hartwick v. Heberling, 364 Il. 523, 530, 4 N.E. (2d) 965, 969 (1936); Brittain v. Farrington, 318 Ill. 474, 149 N.E. 486 (1925).
A contrary rule was announced in Kohtz v. Eldred, 208 Ill. 6o, 69 N.E. 9oo (x9o4), but the
decision, that death within the life of the testator only was meant, could be sustained on the
ground that other provisions of the will affirmatively manifested such an intent. See this
explanation in Fifer v. Allen, 228 I1l. 507, 81 N.E. IIO5 (I9O7), containing an extensive review
of the prior Illinois decisions, and in Carpenter v. Sangamon Trust Co., 229 Ill. 486, 82
N.E. 418 (1907).
9S Defrees v. Brydon, 275 Il. 530, 114 N.E. 336 (i916); cf. Barnes v. Johnston, 233 IIl. 620,
84 N.E. 61o (igo8) (gift over if the first taker should "then" be dead, the quoted word referring
to the time for sale and division by the executor).
6
9 Abrahams v. Sanders, 274 Ill. 452, 113 N.E. 737 (gi6); Lee v. Roberson, 297 Ill. 321,
13o N.E. 774 (1921); Clark v. Leavitt, 330 Ill. 350, i6i N.E. 75, (1928); cf. Tomlin v. Laws,
301 Il. 6x6, 134 N.E. 24 (1922). The fact that in another gift to the same donee the testator
has made no limitation over may also tend to indicate that in the gift in dispute he referred
to death of the first taker at some time subsequent to his own death, Crocker v. VanVlissingen,
230 Ill. 225, 82 N.E. 614 (i9o7); cf. AhIfield v. Curtis, 229 I1. 139,82 N.E. 276 (i9o7).
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taining the limitations. It is not possible to frame any general rule as
to what may be a sufficient manifestation of intent; many factors may be
thought to suggest with more or less force that the testator contemplated
a death in his own life, and intended to condition the gift over accordingly.
In Williamson v. Carnes,97 a testator devised a residue to his children. He
further provided that if any child should die before him, leaving children,
the share of the deceased child should go to such children; and if any child
should die without leaving children, the share of the deceased child should
go to the living children of the testator and the children of any deceased
child. The close association here of the gift over on death "without leaving children" and the dearly substitutional gift in event of the death of a
child in the life of the testator, warranted the conclusion that the former
limitation was intended as an alternative to the latter, to operate only in
the event of death of a child in the life of the testator.98 In like manner,
where there is a close connection in point of language between the reference to the death. of the first taker and a reference to the death of the
testator himself, the conclusion may be induced that the testator referred
to a death of the first taker in his own lifetime. 9 The fact that payment of
legacies to other beneficiaries is charged upon the estate devised to the
first taker has in some instances been thought to indicate that the gift
over on his death without surviving issue was conditioned only on such a
death in the life of the testator; for otherwise the first taker, not having an
indefeasible fee, might find it difficult to raise the funds necessary for payment. 0 0 The fact that a gift over on death of the first taker without surviving issue is applicable to personal property as well as to real property
may be thought to suggest that the testator referred to a death in his own
lifetime only, since it is doubtful if a testator would normally intend to
divest a gift of personalty after it has once come into the actual possession
7284Il. 521, 12oN.E. 585 (1918).
98A similar case is Duryea v. Duryea, 85 Ill. 41 (1877).
99Fishback v. Joesting, 183 Ill. 463, 56 N.E. 62 (igoo). The limitations were: to the "wife
and child or children, or their heirs, who may be living at the time of my decease ..... If it
shall happen that myself, my wife, or my child or children shall depart this life without my
child or children have no heirs," then over.
A comparable situation exists where on the death of the first taker without surviving issue,
the testator has given a larger interest to another beneficiary of the will, "in lieu of the bequest
previously given." The quoted language would seem to fix the death of the testator as the time
for effective operation of the gift over, and to necessitate the conclusion that the testator referred to a death in his own life, Kohtz v. Eldred, 208 IMI.6o, 69 N.E. goo (19o4).
ooDuryea v. Duryea, 85 Ill. 41 (1877); cf. Churchill v. Fleming, 358 ILl. 433, 193 N.E. 497
(1934). But cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 98 Ill. 564 (i881).
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and enjoyment of the donee.Y" While it may be conceded that in the
construction of these limitations over no distinction has usually been
taken upon the last basis here suggested, the point might well be considered in determining the construction to be adopted in an otherwise
doubtful case.
The subtilties of construction in relation to cases of the type here
0
discussed are well illustrated in the decision in Brittain v. Farrington.
I. n successive clauses of his will, the testator had devised various tracts of
land to his children and a grandchild, 'the devises being so drafted as to
suggest the purpose to equalize the shares of the several devisees. In a
subsequent clause, the testator provided, "It is also my will that should
any of my children ....die without issue, or should their death precede
mine, such share ....be divided ....between the other heirs surviv-

ing." One of the children of the testator survived him, but died thereafter
without having had issue. It was held, on construction of the above limitation over, that death in the life of the testator was meant. The court
reached this conclusion on the following line of reasoning: The testator
must have intended the pronoun "their" preceding the word "death" to
refer to "issue," and not to "children," since it was unlikely that he would
have intended to exclude from all benefit the issue of a child who might
die in his lifetime leaving issue. This construction necessitated the
further conclusion that the gift over was conditioned solely on the death
in life of the testator of a child who left no issue to survive the testator.
Since the child whose share was in dispute had survived the testator, he
took an indefeasible fee simple.
C. LIMITATIONS IN THE FORM: TO A; IF HE SHALL DIE LEAVING ISSUE SURVIVING, TO SAID ISSUE; IF HE SHALL DIE WITHOUT LEAVING ISSUE
SURVIVING, TO B

Where the limitations over on the death of the first taker are substantially in the form above set forth, they literally exhaust all possible
contingencies. One or the other of the stated gifts over must come into
possession on the death of the first taker. Whether the estate of the first

taker is declared by the instrument to be a life estate, or whether his
estate is not expressly described, it must be construed to be a fffe estate
only. °0 The limitations over on his death are then contingent remainders.
It should be remembered, however, that while the remainders are each
contingent, one or the other must vest.

1oSee Spencer v.

Spencer, 268 Ill. 332, 342, 1o9 N.E. 300, 303 (1915); Bradsby v. WalIll.
239, 245, 66 N.E. io88, zo89 (i9o3).
10123i8 Ill.
474, 149 N.E. 486 (1925).
103See Subdivision I supra.

lace,
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In the situation discussed in the foregoing paragraph, there is no pressure to construe the phrase "die without surviving issue" to refer to a
death in the life of the testator only. Indeed, it would seem fairly dear
from the language that the reference is to death of the first taker at any
time. Since the first gift over is to the surviving issue of the first taker,
his death is naturally the time for determining the effect of that limitation, regardless of the time of such death. Since the second gift over is
obviously an alternative to the first, death at any time is dearly the
death referred to in that gift also.
Where, however, the estate of the first taker is expressly described as
a fee simple by use of the words "and his heirs," "in fee simple," "absolutely," or some equivalent terms, a difficulty arises. The devise of an
express fee simple is inconsistent with limitations over on death of the
first taker which necessarily terminate his estate at his death. While it
may be theoretically possible to create a fee simple defeasible in any
event at the death of the owner thereof, it is not believed that a conveyor
would normally attempt to create such an estate. 0 4 If it is possible to
reconcile the apparently inconsistent limitations by a reasonable construction, that construction should be adopted. One possibility of reconciliation is apparent. If the limitations over to the surviving issue, and in
default thereof to B, are construed to refer only to a death of the first
taker within some limited period of time, they become perfectly consistent
with the language indicative of a fee simple in the first taker. In a case
where limitations of the sort here considered are contained in a deed,
there is no period of time within which the operative effect of the limitations over can be confined. In the case of a will, the gifts over can be
construed to refer only to death in the life of the testator, thus conferring
upon the first taker an indefeasible fee simple if he should survive the
testator.
That such limitations should have proved perplexing to the courts is
not surprising. An example of the difficulty that has been felt in dealing
with this situation is well illustrated in Ashby v. McKinlock, 0 which has
been stated and discussed previously in Subdivision I. In that case, the
limitations over on the death of the first taker, with or without surviving
issue, appeared literally to exhaust the possible contingencies." °0 As has
104 Ibid.

10

271

Ill.

254, III N.E.

ior (1916).

' It is easy to fall into the error of concluding that, where one gift over is conditioned on
death leaving issue, and the other on death without leaving issue all contingencies have necessarily been covered. Even so excellent a scholar as the late Albert M. Xales would appear
on occasion to have made such an assumption. See Rales, op. cit. supra note io, at § 162,
n. 4o, § r63, n. So. This conclusion, however, assumes that the second gift over is conditioned
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been previously stated, the court rejected most emphatically the contention that the first taker had only a life estate, and apparently reached
the rather extraordinary conclusion that she had a fee simple, though
that fee was certain to be divested at her death. A simpler solution of the
case would have been to hold that the language descriptive of a fee in the
first taker showed the testator's intent to condition the gifts over upon
the death of such first taker in the life of the testator only. That construction, however, was not mentioned.
Since the decision in the Ashby case two other casesx0 7 have come
before the Illinois court, in both of which there was a gift to the
first taker "in fee simple absolute," with limitations over to the surviving issue, if any, and if none, to other persons. The court thought in
both cases that the limitations over exhausted all possible contingencies."'5
It adhered rigidly to the rule that a limitation over on death without surviving issue referred to death of the first taker at any time. The necessary
consequence of these conclusions was that the first takers had only life
estates, and it was so held. The reluctance which was felt in the Ashby
case to cut down to a life estate what the testator had expressly declared
only on death without issue surviving the first taker. If the second gift is upon that contingency and an additional contingency, both of which contingencies must be satisfied, then it is
quite possible that neither gift over will vest. In Ashby v. McKinlock, 271 Ill.
254, I1 N.E.
ioi (1916), the gift over on death of the first taker without surviving issue was to "brothers
and sisters" of the testator "or their children." If that gift over were construed to be to such
brothers and sisters as might survive the first taker, and the descendants of such brothers and
sisters as might have died leaving descendants, it is clear that at the death of the first taker there
might be neither brothers and sisters surviving, nor descendants of such. If, on the other hand,
by a proper construction of the gift over it is to the brothers and sisters of the testator who
may have survived him, with a mere substitution for a brother or sister who may have died
in the lifetime of the first taker of his descendants if he shall have left such descendants surviving him, then the possible contingencies have been exhausted. If a brother or sister has died
without descendants surviving him, his heirs are entitled at death of the first taker to the share
the deceased brother or sister would have taken if living, the heirs taking such interest by
descent. The problem of construction involved is too difficult for further discussion in this
connection. Cf. Kales, op. cit. supra note io, at § 359; Theobald, Wills 761 ff. (8th ed. 1927).
See also note 17 supra.
X07Drager v. McIntosh, 36 III. 46o, 147 N.E. 433 (1925); Liesman v. Liesman, 331 Ill.
287, 162 N.E. 855 (1928).
1o8This

point may admit of argument. See comment on Drager v. McIntosh, 316 Il.46o,

147 N.E. 433 (1925), supra note 17. In Liesman v. Liesman, 331 Ill.
287, x62 N.E. 855 (1928),

the second gift over was to "surviving" children of the testator. Since "surviving" would
naturally be interpreted to mean surviving at the death of the first taker (Kales, op. cit. supra
note io, § 528, n. 9i), one contingency was seemingly not covered-viz., death of the first
taker without surviving issue and without surviving children of the testator. If all contingendes were not exhausted, the decision that the first taker had only a life estate is of doubtful
propriety since the intent to give the first taker a fee simple was expressed.
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to be a fee was evidently not shared by the bench as it was constituted
when these later cases were decided. These later decisions must be taken
to establish the rule that gifts over on death with and without issue surviving refer to such death at any time, even though an expressly described fee simple is thereby cut down to a mere life estate.
D. LIMITATIONS IN THE FORM: TO A FOR LIFE; REMAINDER TO B; IF B SHALL DIE WITHOUT
ISSUE SURVIVING, TO C; (WITH OR WITHOUT THE FURTHER LIMITATION
THAT) IF B SHALL DIE LEAVING ISSUE SURVIVING, TO SAID ISSUE

It should be noted that the situation here described differs from the
situations discussed under Subdivisions IV B and C in that here a life
estate precedes the interest limited to the person in reference to whom
the phrase "die without surviving issue" is employed. The presence of
this prior life estate limited to A is of particular significance. Whether
the limitation be in a deed or a will, the death of the life tenant, A, is a
point of time to which the death of B without surviving issue may be
referred.
Where the limitations are contained in a will, the objections to construing the quoted phrase to mean a death in the life of the testator have
been indicated; also indicated have been the inconveniences which result
from construing that phrase to refer to death at any time when it may
in fact occur. 0 9 In the case of a will, there are three points of time to
which death of the remainderman without issue may be related: the
death of the testator; the death of the life tenant, A; and the death of the
remainderman himself, whenever that may occur. The death of the life
tenant, A, is a point of time which may be intermediate between the
death of the testator on the one extreme, and the death of the remainderman, B, on the other extreme. The death of B without issue which is
intended may well be held to be such a death prior to that of the life
tenant. The death of the life tenant is the time which marks the beginning of enjoyment in possession for the remainderman; it is, moreover,
a point of time probably less remote from the testator's death than the
death of the remainderman himself. The gift over on death of the remainderman without surviving issue can plausibly be construed to mean
his death before the time for enjoyment in possession has arrived. Thus,
a reasonable construction can be given the language employed, with a
minimum of disadvantage to the remaindermanYb°
In some instances, the testator has made clear his intent to condition
the gift over on death of the remainderman in the life of the life tenant.
X09
See Subdivision IV B supra.
110See Johnson v. Boland, 343 Ill. 552, 557, 175 N.E. 794, 796 (1931).
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He may have stated such intent in express terms."' Or, he may have
manifested such an intent by the very nature of the gift over, as where
the property is given over on death of the remainderman without surviving issue to the life tenant."
In the usual instance, the testator has not made his meaning entirely
dear, and a prima facie rule. of construction for such cases must be
adopted. While all the Illinois cases agree that the phrase "death without
surviving issue" is not restricted to such a death in the life of the testator,"3 there has been some vacillation on the part of the supreme court
in making its choice between' the other two possible constructions. In
Kleinhans v. Kleinzans,"4 decided in 1912, the court adopted the rule
that, prima fade, death at any time without surviving issue was meant,"'
even though this conclusion seemed to necessitate a holding that the
remainderman, B, took but a life estate." 6 Two years later, in Lachenmyer v. Gehlbach,1 7 the court announced the opposite conclusion that,
prima fade, death without surviving issue in the life of the life tenant
was meant. An ineffectual attempt was made to distinguish the Kleinhans case. The rule of the Lachenmyer case was approved in a dictum
and a decision in 1916 and I917, respectively."8 Then came the decision
in Gavvin v. Carroll," 9 in 1917, which reaffirmed the rule adopted in the

Kleinhans case, although that decision was not cited. In the Gavvin case,
the court relied upon Fiferv. Allen,1120 obviously not a pertinent authority

because in the latter case, no life estate preceded the interest limited over
on death without surviving issue. In Welch v. Crowe,"' also decided in
' People v. Byrd, 253 Ill.223, 97 N.E. 293 (ig92). The court's description of the remainder
in this case as "contingent" cannot be justified; the result of the decision wbuld have been the
same had the remainder been treated as vested subject to divestiture on death of the remainderman in the life of the life tenant.
113, 94 N.E. 113 (9z).
112Smith v. Dellitt, 249 I1.
113Wilson v. Wilson, 261 Ill.
174y 103 N.E. 743 (i913); Abrahams v. Sanders, 274 Ill.
452,
113 N.E. 737 (i916). The point is either expressly stated, or is assumed, in the decisions cited

hereinafter.
-4

253

Ill.
620, 97 N.E. 1077

(1912).

Ms Cf.

Summers v. Smith, 127 I1. 645, 21 N.E. 9x (1889).
6 It may be doubted whether the gifts over in this case exhausted all possible contingencies, and that doubt was reflected in the opinion. It was held, nevertheless, that the remainderman took only a life estate. See Subdivision I and note 17 supra; also, notes io6 and io8 supra.
117266 MI1.
II, 107 N.E. 202 (1914).
"18 Abrahams v. Sanders, 274 Ill. 452, 113 N.E. 737 (igi6); Sheley v. Sheley, 272 Il.95,
rii N.E. 591 (1916).
478, 114 N.E. 927 (1917).
119 276 Ill.
507, 8I N.E. 1105 (1907).
1" 228 Ill.

278 I1. 244, i1 N.E. 859 (1917).
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the court returned to the rule of the Lachenmyer case and has
consistently adhered thereto in the numerous cases decided between that
1917,

date and the present writing.122 These decisions have so definitely re-

pudiated the holding of the Kleinlians and Gamvin cases that it now may
be assumed to be the established rule that a limitation over on death of
a remainderman without surviving issue refers to his death in the life
of the life tenant only.123 If he survives the life tenant, his fee becomes
indefeasible.124

The rule which has thus been established is but a rule of prima facie
construction, and yields fo any manifestation of*a contrary intent which
may appear from the instrument as a whole. Occasionally sufficient evidence of intent may be found in the instrument, to indicate that the
testator referred to death of the remainderman without surviving issue
in the testator's own life. This conclusion was reached in Siddons v.
Cockrell.2 5 In that case, as the court construed the will, the testator had
devised all his property to his wife for her life, terminable as to a two
thirds part upon her remarriage. He further provided that the wife should
have the whole if she should survive all the children, they having died
without issue; but if any of the children should survive the wife, they
and the descendants of deceased children should have the property.
These limitations were extraordinarily confused and ambiguous. After
remarking that the remainders limited to the children in respect to the
one-third part in which the wife took an absolute life estate, and the twothirds part in which she took a determinable life estate, ought to vest
at the same time, the court decided that the remainders in both parts
vested indefeasibly at the death of the testator; that the deaths referred
to by him were deaths in his own lifetime. It is submitted that there was
nothing in the language employed to justify this conclusion. In Northern
Trust Co. v. VIzeaton.,12 6 a testator had devised all his property to trustees
for the lives of his wife and sister or the survivor, providing that on death
122
Ames v. Smith, 284 Ill. 63, 1i9 N.E. 969 (igi8); Fulwiler v. McClun, 285 Ill.
174, 120
N.E. 458 (1918); Harder v. Matthews, 309 Ill.
54S, 141 N.E. 442 (1923); Risser v. Ayres, 306
Il1.293, 137 N.E. 85i (1923); Smith v. Dugger, 310 1I. 624, 142 N.E. 243 (1924); Johnson v.
Boland, 343 Ill.
552, i75 N.E. 794 (1931); Baird v. Garman, 349 Ill.
597, 182 N.E. 739 (1932);
see Morris v. Phillips, 287 111. 633, 222 N.E. 832 (i919).
"3 Note

especially the opinion in Johnson v. Boland, 343 Ill. 552, 275 N.E. 794 (1931).
' Cases cited in notes 117, 18, 121, 122 supra.
'131
Ill.
653, 23 N.E. 586 (ISgo). The construction of the limitations adopted in this
case by the court was peculiar in more than one respect. See criticism in Kales, op. cit. supra
note xo, at §347.
U 249

I1. 6o6, 94 N.E. 98o (1911).
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of said survivor, the trustees should divide the corpus among named
persons. He further provided that if any one of the remaindermen should
die before his interest should "vest," leaving a child or children surviving
at the time when the estate should "vest," then such child or children
should take the parent's share. The court held here also that the death
of the remainderman to which the testator referred was such death in
the testator's own life. If this decision is to be supported, it must be on
the ground that the testator had conditioned the gift over on death of a
remainderman before his interest should "vest;" that since there was no
condition precedent to such vesting, the remainder vested at the death
of the testator; it followed, therefore, that death in the life of the testator
was meant. This decision, resting upon the assumption that the testator
employed the word "vest" with full knowledge of its technical meaning,
is at least dubious. It would seem just as likely that by "vest" the
testator meant "vest in possession"-a meaning which would have permitted the gift over to be construed as conditioned on' death of the remainderman without issue in the life of the life tenant. In Abraiams
v. Sanders,17 the testator devised real estate to his wife for life, and
after charging legacies in favor of his daughters on the said real estate, he
devised the remainder to his son. In a subsequent clause of the will, he
provided that if any child should "die without definite issue ....before
this will takes effect," his share should pass to the surviving children of
the testator, etc. It was contended that the testator referred to the
death of a child in his own lifetime. The court rejected this construction, putting emphasis on the following facts: that the testator was
eighty-two years of age at the time he executed the will, whereas the son
was comparatively young and unmarried; that the daughters were provided for only in money legacies; that in another clause, the testator had
in express terms provided for the death of his wife in his own lifetime,
and had not used such explicit language in relation to the gift over on
death of a child. The court thought that the phrase "before this will
takes effect" was intended to refer to the division of the estate on death
of the wife. This decision appears to be a doubtful one at the opposite
8
extreme from the two cases previously discussed.2
The prima facie rule of construction yields also to a manifestation of
intent to make the phrase "death without surviving issue" refer to such
a death at any time, whether before or after that of the life tenant. Such
27274 II. 452, 113 N.E. 737 (1916).

As to the significance of the fact that the limitation over was applicable to personal
property, see comment in Subdivision IV B and note ioi supra.
128
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an intent may be expressly declared,"19 or it may be inferred. In one instance, 30 the court inferred such an intent from the fact that the gift
over on death of the remainderman was to the "heirs" of the life tenant,
the court pointing out that the latter could not have heirs during his own
lifetime, and concluding, therefore, that death of the remainderman at
any time must have been intended. In another case,' 3' the limitations
were in the form: to A for lifer remainder to B; and if B should die before
C and D, then the land to pass to C and D. Apparently it was the view
of the court here that the death of B at any time prior to the deaths of
C and D was meant, and not merely such a death in the lifetime of A.
This conclusion would appear sound considering the nature of the limitations and the unqualified reference to the death of B before the deaths of
3
C and D.'

The decision in Pattersonv. McCay,'33holding that the death intended
was death without surviving children at any time, wVhether before or after
the death of the life'tenant, appears to the writer unsound. In that case,
a deed conveyed land to A for life, with a provision that on the death of
A the title should "vest in fee simple" in her daughter, B, and her "children." It was further provided, "in case the said [B] should die before
the said [A], or should leave no children living at the time of her death,"
then the land should vest in fee in C. B had survived A, but had died
without children. In adopting the construction above indicated, the court
was probably misled by the unusual form of the language. Two separate
conditions were apparently stated, in the disjunctive. Since the first of
these conditions referred expressly to death in the life of A, and since the
second was not expressly so limited, there was a certain plausibility in
the view that the second condition must have been intended to refer to
death at any time. No notice was taken of the fact that by the usual
129Beaty

v. Calis, 294 Ill.
424, 128 N.E. 547 (1920).
130 Cutler v. Garber, 289 Ill.
200, 124 N.E. 441 (I919).
131Pitzer

v. Morrison, 272 Ill. 291, III N.E. IoI7 (1916).

132
Attention

may also be called to the rather unusual situation present in Aloe v. Lowe,

278 Ill. 233, 115 N.E. 862 (1917). There the limitations were in substance as follows: to A, B
and C for their lives; on the death of any one of the life tenants leaving issue surviving, onethird of the corpus to said issue; on death of any one of the life tenants leaving no issue surviving, one-third of the corpus to the survivor or survivors; and if all the life tenants should die
without leaving issue surviving, then to X. It will be observed that the effect of these limitations was to create in respect to each undivided third of the property a life estate, with remainders in the alternative to the issue of the particular life tenant and to the survivors of the
life tenants. It was held that a remainder which vested in a surviving life tenant under these
limitations was subject to divestiture on his death without surviving issue at any time.
11' 313 Ill.
49i, 145 N.E. 87 (1924).
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rules of construction, the disjunctive "or" should have been read as
"and" in this instance. 34 If "or" should be taken literally, the conditions
would be separate and distinct; on the death of B in the life of A, the land
would pass over to C, regardless of whether B left children surviving or
not. Such a result would clearly be inconsistent with the manifested intent that B and her "children" should have the land at the death of A.
Had "or" been read as "and," there would have been a gift over on two
concurrent contingencies, both of which must have been satisfied before
the gift over could have become effective in possession. Since B had survived A, her fee would have been indefeasible. There was nothing in the
language of the instrument in this case to warrant the conclusion that
death at any time was meant; the usual rule, that the gift over was conditioned on death. of B without children in the life of the life tenant,
should have been applied.
There is one type of case in which the Illinois court has applied the
usual rule despite the serious doubt that may arise as to the intent of
the creator of the limitations. This type of case is illustrated by Smith
v. Dugger. 3S A father had conveyed land by deed to his three sons, with
a provision that if any one should die "before marriage and legitimate
heirs," then the land should "vest" in the other living grantees. Then
there followed a second provision, wherein the grantor reserved to himself the enjoyment of the land during his life. All three sons survived the
grantor. The condition of their title was the issue in a suit brought by
them for specific performance of a contract to convey the land. It was
the decision of the court that they had a marketable title. The deed
created an executory interest conditioned on the death of any one of the
sons in the life of the grantor; since all had survived the death of the
grantor, their title had become indefeasible. In a dissenting opinion,
Thompson, J., held that this deed should be construed in the same way
that a will of the grantor would be construed; that the death intended,
therefore, was death at any time.16 It would appear that there are two
factors which support the argument of the dissenting opinion. First, it
is probably true that a deed of this kind is viewed by the grantor as the
rough equivalent of a will. While such an instrument differs from a will
X34Jarman, Wills *471-3 (6th Am. ed. 1893); Theobald, Wills 789 (8th ed. 1927).
x'3310 ]D1. 624, 142 N.E. 243 (1924).
336See also the dissenting opinion of the same justice in Harder v. Matthews, 3og Ill. 548,
41 N.E. 442 (1923), a case with facts similar to those in Smith v. Dugger, 310

N.E. 243 (1924), and similarly decided.

Ill. 624,

142

GIFTS OVER ON DEATH OF FIRST TAKER

in that it creates immediately upon delivery an irrevocable future interest,
it does accomplish the same general objective as a testamentary instrument. This fact probably should be taken into consideration in determining the proper construction of the deed. If the grantor had executed a
will containing the same gift over as the deed, that gift would have been
conditioned on death of the first taker at any time since there would have
been in that situation no preceding life estate in the conveyor. Secondly,
some significance may be attached to the fact that the reservation of a
life estate to the grantor followed the clause creating the executory interest. In the case of a deed creating a life estate in another person, followed
by a remainder with an executory limitation over, the executory limitation naturally appears subsequently to the clause creating the life estate.
While it may be unsound reasoning to make a decision hinge solely
upon the relative positions of the clauses creating the life estate and the
executory interest, still where there are other factors suggesting doubt as
to the intent, the relative positions may become important. Where the
reservation of the life estate is last, as in the principal case, there is at
least less likelihood that the grantor intended the executory limitation to
become operative only upon a death in his own lifetime. It appears to
the writer that there is a slight preponderance of evidence in this type
of case to justify the conclusion that death at any time was meant.
The facts in the case just discussed exhibited one peculiarity not commonly found, which is worth a passing comment. The limitation over
was conditioned on death "before marriage and legitimate heirs," in contrast to the common limitation over on "death without issue," or "without surviving issue." In limitations of the common type mentioned, the
conveyor has not in express language stated the time of the death to
which he refers. It may be suggested that in the Smith case, the condition, if taken at face value, does expressly state the time of death. "Before
marriage and legitimate heirs," construed literally, means before the
marriage of the remainderman and before birth of issue to him. On a
literal construction, his fee would become indefeasible upon the birth of
a child.'- 1 Where a conveyor has been explicit to this extent in referring
to the time of death, it appears doubtful whether a court can properly
X37 A gift over on death of the first taker "without having children," is construed "without
having had children." The fee becomes indefeasible in the first taker on birth of a child, though
such child predeceases the first taker, Jarman, Wills *o56 (6th Am. ed. 1893); Theobald,
Wills 792 (8th ed. 1927). It is believed that "before marriage and legitimate heirs" is language
demanding even more imperatively the indicated construction.
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read into the limitation the restriction that the death must occur in the
life of the life tenant.38 If, moreover, it is the actual intent that the remainderman's fee shall become indefeasible on birth of issue, birth of issue
at any time must be meant; it is not reasonable to suppose that the
grantor intended that the fee of the remainderman should be divested
merely because he had not had a child born in the life of the life tenant.
The peculiar nature of the limitation over, therefore, supplied an additional reason for not applying the rule restricting death to death in the
life of the life tenant, and an additional ground upon which the decision
may be criticized.
The title to the present subdivision indicates that there may be a
single gift over on the death of the remainderman without surviving
issue, or there may be two gifts over-one to the surviving issue if any,
and the other in default of such issue to C. The result is actually the
same whether there be the single gift over or the alternative gifts indicated. In either case, the gift or gifts over are conditioned on death of the
remainderman in the life of the life tenant. It may be observed, however,
that if there be alternative gifts over which exhaust the possibilities, then
the remainderman B can take only a life estate if "death without surviving
issue" means death at any time. 39 This fact is a further reason for construing the quoted phrase to refer only to death in the life of the life
tenant. There is a suggestion of inconsistency between limitations over
which limit to a life estate an interest not expressly so described. It is
apparent that the courts have on occasion felt the influence of this argument. 40 If the estate of the remainderman should be expressly described
as a fee simple, the inconsistency between such description and the limitations over exhausting the contingencies would become patent; 4' and it
would then be exceedingly difficult to justify any other cofistruction than
that the death referred to is such a death in the life of the life tenant only.
138 See the dissenting opinion of Thompson, J., 310 I]. 624, 628, 142 N.E. 243, 245 (1924);
cf. Pitzer v. Morrison, 272 IBl. 291, 111 N.E. 1017 (x916) (death of the remainderman "before"
C and D held to refer to such death at any time, whether before or after the death of the life
tenant).
'39 Cf. Kleinhans v. Kleinhans, 253 Il. 620, 97 N.E. 1077 (1912). And see the previous discussions of gifts over exhausting all possible contingencies, Subdivision I and note 17 supra;
Subdivision IV C and notes io6, io8 supra.
140 Lachemnyer v. Gehlbach, 266 Ill. 11, 107 N.E. 202 (19x4); Johnson v. Boland, 343 Ill.
552, 175 N-.E. 794 (1931). While it is doubtful whether the limitations over in these cases did
exhaust all possible contingencies, it is apparent that the court thought they did.
4

Cf. discussion under Subdivision IV C supra.
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E. LIMITATIONS OVER UNDER A TRUST FOR YUTURE DISTRIBUTION
OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN ATTEMPTED RESTRAINT UPON
AIJENATION

In the preceding subdivision, the writer has considered the problem
presented where the limitations are to A for life, remainder to B, with a
gift over on his death without surviving issue. The arguments justifying
the rule which relates "death without surviving issue" to the death of the
life tenant have been set forth. A similar situation exists where property
has been conveyed to a trustee for future distribution among several beneficiaries, with a provision that in event of the death of any beneficiary
without surviving issue, his share shall go over. The arguments previously discussed would warrant the conclusion that the settlor here referred to the death of a beneficiary before final division and distribution
by the trustee. In Spencer v. Spencer,142 the Illinois Supreme Court so
held. It was pointed out in the opinion that the problem had not previously been presented to the Illinois courts, but that such was the rule
in other jurisdictions. In its formal statement of the rule adopted, which
the court took from Theobald on Wills, it inserted a qualifying clause, the
importance of which is not wholly clear. The qualification limits the
operation of the rule adopted to the case where the donee in the gift over
is "contemplated as taking through the medium of the same trustee."
Apparently this means that "death, without surviving issue" will not be
construed to be limited to such death during the trust period unless the
settlor has indicated that he expects the donee in the gift over to take
from the hand of the trustee. On the actual facts of the case, the only
language in the gift over suggesting such an expectation were the words,
"to be distributed in accordance with the provisions of this will." No
discussion of the apparent qualification of the rule is to be found in the
opinion. It is doubtful whether the adoption of this qualification would
have any other effect than to complicate further a difficult problem of
43
construction.
Ill.

IO9 N.E. 300 (I915).
X43 The court stated the rule as follows: ".
if the fund is vested in a trustee who is
directed to distribute it at a certain time, so that the trusts then determine, and the legatees
who are to take upon the death of prior legatees without issue are contemplated as taking
through the medium of the same trustee, the rule then is to restrict the meaning of 'death
without issue' to death without issue before the time of distribution," 268 Ill. 332, 341, 10o9
N.E. 300, 303 (i9rs). See Theobald, Wills 747 (8th ed. 1927). It may be suggested that the
indicated qualification of the rule above discussed is actually inconsistent with that portion
of the opinion in which the court apparently indicates its view that once distribution has been
made, the distributee takes absolutely. See 268 Inl. 332, 341-2, 1o9 N.E. 300, 303 (1915).
142 268

332,

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

In Defrees v. Brydon, 4 4 a testator had devised a residue on trust for
"the sole use" of five named children, providing that as to any child, the
trust might be terminated by the trustee at any time in his discretion;
that when division should be made by the trustee, each child should
have a one-fifth part of the corpus, "to him or his heirs forever"; and,
further, if any child should die before the testator "or afterwards," without leaving issue, his share should go over. After a division had been
effected by the trustee, one of the children died without leaving issue.
It was held that her share went over. The court put great weight on the
fact that the will expressly provided for death before the testator "or
afterwards," taking this to mean death at any time. Considering the
whole of the provisions relative to the death of any child, one is left in
doubt as to the true meaning of "death without surviving issue" as it
was here used. On the one hand, it may be noted that the testator had
provided that upon distribution by the trustee, a child should take his
share, "to him and his heirs forever." This language suggests strongly
that the testator did not contemplate any divestiture of a share once it
had come into the possession of a child. On the other hand, two factors
suggest that the testator referred to death of a child without issue at any
time. He had made not only the gift over above mentioned, but also a
gift over if any child should die leaving issue, and such issue should die
childless.' 45 And he had further provided that any child should have the
power to devise and bequeath his share to any lineal descendant of the
testator or his wife. The very nature of these provisions suggests that the
testator was looking forward to a time beyond the termination of the

trust.
In Beaty v. Callis,116 land had been devised to a widow for her life,
and on her death to a granddaughter, with a provision that if the said
granddaughter should be under the age of twenty-one years at the death
of the widow, a trustee should be appointed to manage the said property
until the majority of the granddaughter. There was a further provision
that if the granddaughter should die before the widow "or subsequent
thereto," leaving surviving no "children or descendants of such," the
land should go over. The granddaughter attained the age of twenty-one
and died without leaving issue. It was held that the land went over.
The will expressly provided that the land should go over in event of the
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death of the granddaughter without surviving issue "subsequent" to the
death of the wife. The court thought that death without surviving issue
prior to the granddaughter's attainment of twenty-one could not have
been meant because it would have been practically impossible for her to
have died under twenty-one leaving "descendants" of her children surviving. This decision appears to be reasonable on the facts.
It not infrequently happens that a testator undertakes to impose a
restraint upon the alienation of property by the devisee thereof. Often
the restraint is limited to the period preceding the attainment by the
devisee of a stipulated age. If the same instrument makes a gift over in
event of the death of the devisee without surviving issue, it would seem
reasonable to construe that gift over as prima fade conditioned on death
without surviving issue during the period of the attempted restraint,
especially if there be a close connection in point of language between the
provision imposing the restraint and the provision limiting the property
over on death without issue surviving. The fact that the restraint itself
may be invalid is immaterial in so far as the intent of the testator in
reference to the operation of the gift over is concerned.' 47 The imposition
of a restraint upon alienation limited to a definite period of time, or
until the devisee shall have attained a stipulated age, carries a strong
implication of intent that at the end of the specified period, or upon the
attainment of the designated age, the devisee shall have full power to
convey an absolute fee. If, however, his fee is held to be defeasible on
his death without surviving issue, whenever that death may occur, he is
practically precluded from conveying for his whole lifetime. In Noth v.
Noth, X41 the court gave no consideration to the reasoning here suggested,
but held that the gift over was operative on death at any time, despite the
fact that the gift over was contained in the same clause of the will as the
attempted restraint.
In Clark v. Leavitr 49 the two factors here discussed-a trust for future
distribution and an attempted restraint upon alienation-were apparently both present. A testator had devised real estate to a daughter,
providing that she should have only the income therefrom until she attained the age of thirty, and that any conveyance by her should be void
until she acquired "full power to sell the same." In the succeeding clause
of the will, the testator further provided that should the daughter "die
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without issue," the property should be sold and the proceeds divided
among brothers and sisters of the testator. On death of the daughter without having had issue, it was held: that "death without issue" meant
"without having had issue"; that the clause, "until she shall have full
power to sell the same," meant until she should have attained the age of
thirty and should have had issue born to her; and that the death without
issue referred to was not restricted to death prior to her attainment of the
age of thirty. In the opinion of the writer, this decision was in error on
each of the three points stated. The objections to construing "death without issue" to mean "without having had issue" have been previously considered.1S° The clause, "until she shall have full power to sell," must certainly have been intended by the testator to refer to the daughter's attainment of the age of thirty; it is too much to imagine that he knew how
the court would construe the phrase "die without issue," and that he
therefore realized that the daughter could not have "full power" to convey
until issue had been born. That the testator should have intended to make
the interest of his daughter defeasible for her whole lifetime for the benefit
of his brothers and sisters, who would probably die before the daughter, is
unlikely; it would seem more probable that he contemplated a trust for
management of the property until the daughter should have attained the
age of thirty, and that in the gift over he referred to her death before her
attainment of that age and before she became entitled to actual possession
of the property upon termination of the trust.
'so Subdividion III C supra.

